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The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding 
Andrew A. Schwartz* 
Abstract 
Securities crowdfunding is premised on two core policy goals: 
inclusivity and efficiency. First, crowdfunding is conceived as an 
inclusive system where all entrepreneurs are given a chance to pitch 
their idea to the “crowd.” Second, crowdfunding is supposed to be 
an efficient way to channel funds from public investors to promising 
startup companies. There is a fundamental tension between these 
two policy goals, however. A totally inclusive system would ensure 
that platforms list any and every company that wants to 
participate. But platforms need to curate and select the companies 
they list in order to establish a reputation as a reliable market for 
investors. This gatekeeping function aids efficiency, but is exclusive 
by its nature. Hence, the tension between inclusive and efficient 
crowdfunding. 
This Article provides a theoretical and an empirical analysis of 
inclusivity versus efficiency in crowdfunding. It also compares the 
American crowdfunding system with its counterpart in New 
Zealand using original research collected by the author during a 
six-month residency in that country. This research reveals that 
crowdfunding in New Zealand is much more financially successful 
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than in the United States. This Article explains this outperformance 
on the basis that New Zealand’s system is focused solely on 
efficiency, even at the expense of inclusivity. In the United States, 
by contrast, we closed our eyes to the tension between efficiency and 
inclusivity and tried to achieve both at the same time. In practice, 
and perhaps as could have been expected, this has led to only minor 
success on both fronts. 
Broadening the analysis out, we see that inclusive 
crowdfunding is a luxury that only certain countries can manage, 
depending on their existing systems for entrepreneurial finance. 
The United States has a huge and sophisticated venture capital 
industry and thus can afford to sacrifice some efficiency in our 
crowdfunding system in order to advance inclusivity. But New 
Zealand has long had very little venture capital investment and 
hence a real need to develop crowdfunding as an effective new 
means for efficiently channeling capital to the country’s startup 
companies. The need to consciously trade off inclusivity and 
efficiency is an important lesson from the present research. 
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I. Introduction 
Securities crowdfunding—a new form of Internet-based public 
stock market modelled on Kickstarter and other reward 
crowdfunding websites1—has a contradiction at its core. On the 
one hand, crowdfunding seeks to create an inclusive system where 
any and all entrepreneurs, regardless of who they know or where 
they are from, are invited to pitch their company directly to “the 
crowd” (the broad public).2 On the other, crowdfunding is supposed 
to be an efficient system where capital-starved startups and small 
businesses can get the funding they need to grow, create jobs, and 
contribute to the economy.3 
These policy goals are in tension. A totally inclusive system 
would impose a legal requirement on crowdfunding platforms—
websites that act like online stock exchanges—to include any and 
every company that wants to list on their site.4 Reward 
                                                                                                     
 1. See infra Part II.B (detailing the parallels between securities 
crowdfunding and ordinary crowdfunding). 
 2. Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 
672 [hereinafter Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding]. 
 3. See id. at 666 (observing that the “rich academic literature” on securities 
crowdfunding “largely focuses on questions of efficiency and efficacy”). 
 4. See id. at 671 (“An inclusive environment, broadly defined as one in 
which ‘all people feel valued and respected and have access to the same 
opportunities,’ can generate positive effects.”). 
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crowdfunding generally follows this model: Kickstarter does not 
screen, curate, or vet the projects before presenting them to the 
crowd; anyone with an idea can take a shot.5 
But securities crowdfunding platforms have a clear business 
need to exclude at least some of the companies who seek to 
participate, in order to establish a reputation as a reliable place for 
people to invest.6 Imagine a law that required the New York Stock 
Exchange to list on its Big Board any company that asked! Just as 
with traditional securities markets, some sort of gatekeeping 
function for the platform seems vital for the system to function 
effectively—or maybe at all.7 Yet gatekeeping necessarily implies 
including some companies and excluding others, a direct affront to 
the goal of inclusivity and unmediated access to the crowd.8 Hence 
the tension between inclusivity and efficiency in securities 
crowdfunding.9 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
struggled to resolve this tension from the earliest days. The initial 
regulations, proposed by the SEC in 2013, adopted a radical 
version of inclusivity that would have required online 
crowdfunding platforms to list any company that asked to be 
included, regardless of the platform’s view of its prospects or the 
price of the securities.10 Public commenters, however, pilloried that 
                                                                                                     
 5. See Kickstarter Basics, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/ 
faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (answering basic questions 
about Kickstarter and its policies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 6. Infra notes 275–278 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the integral role of gatekeepers, or lack 
thereof, in the success of crowdfunding operations). 
 8. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 662 (“Inclusivity 
is core to the nature of crowdfunding as a distinct form of capital raising.”). 
 9. The present work is focused solely on inclusivity as it applies to 
entrepreneurs. Inclusivity as it applies to investors, while beyond the scope of the 
current work, is apparent from the fact that the general public is invited to 
participate on the investor side. See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital 
Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 611 (2015) [hereinafter Schwartz, Digital 
Shareholder] (“Once crowdfunding begins, anybody with a startup will be able to 
go online and offer a piece of the action to the American people. And the 
community of investors . . . will be inclusive and diverse as well.”). 
 10. See infra Part II.D (analyzing the SEC’s proposed rule for inclusion of 
companies on its site listings). 
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proposal as being overly harmful to efficiency.11 In the end, the 
SEC relented, and the final version of its crowdfunding regulations 
(operative since 2016) do allow platforms to pick and choose which 
companies to list on their sites.12 This episode, described in Part 
II.D below, neatly encapsulates crowdfunding’s inherent tension 
between efficiency and inclusivity.  
Securities crowdfunding, while born in the United States, has 
become a worldwide phenomenon,13 with New Zealand leading the 
charge.14 As Part III describes, that country was one of the earliest 
foreign jurisdictions with a functioning legal regime for 
crowdfunding, having launched its equity crowdfunding market in 
2014,15 two years ahead of the United States.16 Since then, New 
Zealand has become an international leader in the field, making it 
an ideal destination for an academic study of this emerging area 
in securities regulation.17 
The author accordingly spent the first half of 2017 on the 
ground in New Zealand to study its crowdfunding law and 
                                                                                                     
 11. See infra Part II.D (highlighting the effect of public comments on the 
final rule). 
 12. See infra Part II.D (discussing the SEC’s final rule regarding company 
listings on platforms). 
13.  See KIM WALES, PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A 
GUIDE TO THE NEW CAPITAL MARKETS FOR JOB CREATORS, INVESTORS, AND 
ENTREPRENEURS 21–54 (2018) (describing securities crowdfunding laws recently 
enacted in dozens of nations around the world). 
 14. See infra Part III (discussing New Zealand’s recent, and quick, 
development in the field of crowdfunding). 
 15. New Zealand’s system is called “equity” crowdfunding because it is 
limited to the issuance of shares of stock. See Joseph J. Dehner & Jin Kong, 
Equity-Based Crowdfunding Outside the USA, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 413, 418 (2014) 
(“The equity model offers investors the possibility of sharing in the increase over 
time in the value of a business, as well as the potential for dividends distributed 
from net annual profits of the venture.”). Our domestic system is called 
“securities” crowdfunding because United States law permits any type of security, 
not just equity, to be crowdfunded. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding 
Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, 
Crowdfunding Securities] (“The new federal CROWDFUND Act authorizes the 
‘crowdfunding’ of securities, defined as the sale of unregistered securities over the 
Internet to large numbers of retail investors, each of whom only invests a small 
dollar amount.”).  
 16. See infra Part IV.A (noting the time difference between New Zealand and 
the United States). 
 17. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting that New Zealand is more successful with 
crowdfunding because it is willing to focus on efficiency instead of inclusivity). 
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marketplace, conducting local research and interviewing 
entrepreneurs, platform operators, investors, lawyers, academics, 
and government officials (including the Minister of Commerce). 
This Article is based on this original research and analyses of the 
United States and New Zealand crowdfunding markets in terms of 
inclusivity and efficiency.18 
In my research, I found that New Zealand never really had to 
grapple with the tension between inclusivity and efficiency, simply 
because they are not trying to achieve both goals.19 Rather, as Part 
III.C shows, their statute and regulations were designed for 
efficiency, and efficiency only.20 Indeed, key components of New 
Zealand’s crowdfunding law help achieve efficiency at the direct 
expense of inclusivity.21 Platforms are empowered to, and do, take 
their role as gatekeepers very seriously, and have always had the 
clear power to exclude anyone they wish.22 In the end, they are 
rather exclusive, especially the leader, Snowball Effect, which lists 
only 2% of the hundreds of companies that ask to be included on 
the site.23 
With a laser-like focus on efficiency, New Zealand has 
established a crowdfunding market that is orders of magnitude 
more financially successful than its counterpart in the United 
States.24 Data presented in Part IV.A compares the first year of 
crowdfunding in New Zealand (2014–2015) with the first year of 
crowdfunding in the United States (2016–2017).25 The numbers 
                                                                                                     
 18. Other aspects of my research are reported and discussed in other articles, 
including Andrew A. Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 2018 N.Z. 
L. REV. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Schwartz, Crowdfunding in New Zealand]. 
 19. See infra Part III.C (noting that New Zealand prefers to focus on 
efficiency). 
 20. See infra Part III.C (stating that New Zealand seeks the utmost 
efficiency). 
 21. See infra Part III.C (noting that New Zealand is willing to risk inclusivity 
to promote efficiency). 
 22. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing how New Zealand promotes efficiency 
by allowing platforms to exclude who they want). 
 23. See infra Part IV.A.1 (describing the exclusivity of crowdfunding 
platforms in New Zealand). 
 24. See infra Part IV.A (detailing New Zealand’s success in the use of 
crowdfunding and the efficiency of its use). 
 25. See infra Part IV.A (comparing New Zealand and the United States’ first 
years of crowdfunding). 
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are astounding: Scaled for the size of its economy,26 and focusing 
on the first year in each jurisdiction, New Zealand had thirteen 
times as many crowdfunding campaigns which collectively raised 
about thirty times as much capital, and the success rate for New 
Zealand crowdfunding campaigns was about 80%, compared with 
50% in the United States.27 In other words, freed from a quest for 
inclusivity, New Zealand has succeeded in creating a much more 
efficient system for channeling capital to startup companies and 
small businesses than has the United States. 
But the United States had two policy goals, both inclusivity 
and efficiency, so it should come as no surprise that New Zealand, 
which focused solely on the latter, would outperform on that 
front.28 This raises the question of how inclusive the American 
system is in practice, and that issue is taken up in Part IV.B, which 
analyzes the empirical evidence from crowdfunding’s recently 
concluded first year. As will become clear, the data suggests that 
American crowdfunding is relatively inclusive, as platforms seem 
to exercise their gatekeeping function in a more flexible manner 
than in New Zealand.29 
In the United States, very young startups that lack revenue, 
and that lack pre-existing supporters, are not screened out, but 
rather are often given a chance—for better or worse—to pitch their 
ideas to the crowd.30 In the United States, the average age of a 
crowdfunding company is just two years and almost none have 
previous investors; however, in New Zealand, the average age is 
eight years and it is common to have pre-existing investors.31 In 
terms of demographic inclusiveness, the picture is mixed.32 
Finally, the notably lower success rate for crowdfunding 
                                                                                                     
 26. New Zealand’s GDP is about 1% that of the United States. 
 27. See infra Part IV.A (detailing New Zealand’s success). 
 28. See infra Part IV.A (demonstrating why New Zealand has been more 
successful than the United States). 
 29. See infra Part IV.B (stating New Zealand is more stringent with its 
gatekeeping). 
 30. See infra Part IV.A (demonstrating the United States’ willingness to 
include more companies on their crowdfunding platforms). 
 31. See infra Part IV.A (comparing the average age of crowdfunding startups 
in the United States and New Zealand). 
 32. See infra Part IV.B (discussing demographics of entrepreneurs raising 
money through securities crowdfunding). 
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campaigns in the United States (50%) compared with New Zealand 
(80%) also indicates that the American system is more open and 
inclusive of entrepreneurs, and more likely to let a highly 
speculative startup at least try to convince the crowd.33 
What explains the different approaches to crowdfunding in 
America and New Zealand? It is not because New Zealand cares 
little for inclusivity, and only about efficiency. Rather, it appears 
to stem from the very different levels of other types of startup 
capital in each country. The United States has long had the largest 
and most mature system of venture capital (VC) and angel 
financing in the world, and could afford to use crowdfunding as a 
complementary system more focused on inclusive opportunities for 
entrepreneurs.34 New Zealand has long had a much thinner pool of 
VC and angel financing, even for its size, and had a national 
interest in using crowdfunding as a substitute for those forms of 
startup finance.35 It could not afford to be distracted by a secondary 
goal of inclusivity. 
This comparison between the United States and New Zealand 
holds a broader lesson that is especially important to the many 
other countries currently drafting (or reforming36) their own 
crowdfunding laws: Inclusive crowdfunding is a luxury.37 As Part 
V explains, jurisdictions with low levels of VC and angel financing 
(e.g., Italy and Spain) may wish to ignore inclusivity and just focus 
on creating an efficient system for crowdfunding.38 Jurisdictions 
that already have abundant VC and angel funding (e.g., Israel and 
the United States) can afford to employ crowdfunding as a way to 
                                                                                                     
 33. See infra Part IV.B (considering the success rates of crowdfunding 
companies in New Zealand and the United States). 
 34. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the United States’ prowess for venture 
capitalism, especially in Silicon Valley). 
 35. See infra Part IV.B (discussing New Zealand’s general lack of venture 
capitalism and use for crowdfunding). 
 36. The United States, through the Financial Choice Act of 2017, is seeking 
to amend its current crowdfunding law. See, e.g., H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 476–
479 (2017) (amending the federal crowdfunding law). 
 37. See infra Part V (noting how inclusivity provides greater opportunity and 
is a policy not followed everywhere else). 
 38. See infra Part V (elaborating on the trade-off between inclusivity and 
efficiency and why a country may choose to focus on one over the other).  
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promote entrepreneurial participation among a broad segment of 
society.39 
II. Securities Crowdfunding in the United States 
This Part introduces the concept of securities crowdfunding, 
as well as the domestic legal authority and policy behind it. 
Authorized by a federal statute in 2012 and implemented through 
SEC regulations in 2016, securities crowdfunding has two primary 
policy goals: First, it seeks to give promising entrepreneurs an 
efficient means of gathering seed capital from the public.40 Second, 
it aims to create an inclusive form of entrepreneurial finance that 
would give anyone and everyone the opportunity to pitch their idea 
to the public.41 
These two goals are in fundamental tension, however, because 
a fully inclusive system that excluded no one would be hopelessly 
inefficient.42 This tension played itself out during the regulatory 
process, as the SEC initially adopted a radically inclusive rule but 
ended up issuing final regulations that prioritized efficiency at the 
expense of inclusivity.43 
A. Precursor: Reward Crowdfunding 
Securities crowdfunding evolved out of the prior concept of 
“reward crowdfunding,” which is practiced on Kickstarter and 
other similar websites.44 Reward crowdfunding, in turn, describes 
                                                                                                     
 39. See infra Part V (finding that Israel and the United States have other 
opportunities for companies to start outside of crowdfunding, allowing for 
crowdfunding platforms to be less selective). 
 40. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 666 (noting that 
new literature is discussing the efficiencies of crowdfunding). 
 41. See id. at 673 (“[A] fundamental and express goal of retail crowdfunding 
is to break down the differential treatment of accredited investors and everyone 
else.”). 
 42. See infra Part II.D (discussing the tension between inclusivity and 
efficiency in crowdfunding). 
 43. See infra Part II.D (discussing the final rule eventually implemented by 
the SEC). 
 44. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that 
securities crowdfunding was built from reward crowdfunding); Building Rewards, 
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an Internet-based marketplace for the financing of entrepreneurial 
projects.45 In a typical Kickstarter campaign, an artist or 
entrepreneur posts to a dedicated website a description of the 
project she wants to pursue, the amount of money she needs to 
fund it, and usually promises some sort of reward or benefit to 
those who provide funding.46 Members of the public—the 
“crowd”—peruse the various projects available on the website, 
decide which one(s) they want to support, and then pledge their 
money to the cause.47 If a given project reaches its target amount, 
the money is collected and transmitted to the entrepreneur; if a 
project fails to meet its target, then the deal is off and no money 
changes hands.48 
For example, a rock band that wants to record an album might 
post the idea along with a sample track and ask the crowd to 
contribute $20 per person. In return, the band promises to send a 
copy of the CD once it is completed. The band uses the money 
collected upfront to rent a recording studio, hire a producer, et 
cetera. This simple idea has grown in less than a decade into a 
multi-billion dollar market: Kickstarter alone reports that over $3 
billion has been contributed on its website since its founding in 
2009.49 
                                                                                                     
KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/rewards (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2018) (discussing common rewards offered in crowdfunding) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 45. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (“In reward 
crowdfunding, financial backers of a project receive its fruits, such as a book, CD, 
or video game.”). 
 46. See id. (noting different types of rewards offered in exchange for financial 
backing). 
 47. See id. at 672 (“[T]he very concept is to invite ‘the great mass of people’—
the crowd—to invest in whichever startup companies and small businesses they 
choose.”). 
 48. This description is known as an “all-or-nothing” model, which is the type 
practiced on the leading reward crowdfunding website, Kickstarter. See 
Kickstarter Basics, supra note 5 (stating a project must achieve its monetary 
fundraising goals in order to receive the funds). Other reward crowdfunding 
websites, including Indiegogo, do not follow this model and allow the 
entrepreneur to collect however much money is pledged. See How it Works for 
Entrepreneurs, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/how-it-works (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2018) (describing “flexible funding”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 49. See Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/ 
stats (last updated Feb. 17, 2018, 8:50 AM) (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) 
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Most importantly for present purposes, Kickstarter and other 
reward crowdfunding websites are totally inclusive platforms 
where anyone with an idea can post their project and ask the crowd 
for funding. Kickstarter does not pre-screen, curate or vet the 
projects prior to presenting them to the crowd. Rather, anyone with 
a project can participate.50 
Many reward crowdfunding projects fail to reach their targets, 
of course; on Kickstarter, for example, more than 350,000 projects 
in total have been posted, yet only 124,000 of those have been 
successfully funded.51 But the crowd is fickle and as such gives its 
financial support to certain projects, but not others.52 Indeed, the 
huge amount of failed projects is itself an indication of the reward 
crowdfunding’s inclusive nature: All entrepreneurs are invited, not 
just those with clearly great ideas or those that are likely to get 
funded.53 
                                                                                                     
(highlighting over $3 billion pledged, 130,000 funded projects, 14,000,000 
backers, and almost 43,000,000 pledges on Kickstarter, alone) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 50. Kickstarter does have certain prohibitions. It can only be used to fund 
“projects,” rather than to raise money for charity or to sell investments. See 
Creator Questions, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/ 
creator+questions (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that only certain projects 
are allowed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Additionally, 
certain items are specifically barred. See Prohibited Items, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/rules/prohibited (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) 
(prohibiting medical treatments, pornographic material and other “illegal, 
heavily regulated, or potentially dangerous” projects) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). But the key point is that Kickstarter would 
not exclude a project because it thinks it is a poor idea, or because it doubts the 
capabilities of the entrepreneur. See Creator Questions, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator+questions (last visited Jan. 11, 
2018) (“[W]e do not investigate a creator’s ability to complete their project.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Moreover, many of the types of 
campaigns that are barred from Kickstarter, such as charitable donations, would 
be welcome on other crowdfunding sites. See, e.g., GOFUNDME, 
https://www.gofundme.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that it is a 
crowdfunding site that welcomes charitable campaigns) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 49 (presenting total activity on 
Kickstarter). 
 52. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 672 (noting that 
the crowd donates to whichever companies it wants, but not necessarily every 
company will receive funding). 
 53. See id. at 662 (“Retail crowdfunding is the most inclusive form of 
securities crowdfunding, in the sense that everyone is invited regardless of who 
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This inclusive nature of reward crowdfunding introduces 
certain costs. Because only 35% of the projects posted on 
Kickstarter succeed and obtain funding, this means that a large 
majority of the projects posted end up as a waste of time and 
resources for the creators and backers.54 To post a project takes 
time and effort; creators commonly produce a video, draft copy, 
promote the project, and so on.55 And backers who review and 
pledge their support spend time and energy researching their 
choices. But if the project fails to reach its target fundraising 
amount, all of those resources go down the drain, with nothing to 
show for it.56 To date, about $340 million has been pledged on 
Kickstarter to projects that ultimately failed.57 
On the other hand, the costs of reward crowdfunding are 
pretty modest overall. The cost of creating and posting a project 
proposal is generally pretty low, due to the simple online format.58 
The market is almost totally unregulated; thus, the compliance 
costs are de minimis. Given that the whole market takes place on 
the Internet, the research effort expended by backers who invest 
in failed projects is probably small in most instances. Moreover, 
even a project that does not reach its target may still benefit the 
company by, for instance, forcing the founders to concretize and 
document their ideas for the business. Finally, just because 65% of 
projects fail, this does not necessarily imply that market 
participants spent 65% of their time and energy on that group. 
Rather, the 35% of successful projects may well have commanded 
                                                                                                     
they are.”). 
 54. See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 49 (finding that the failure rate on 
Kickstarter is over 35%).  
 55. See Kickstarter Basics, supra note 5 (noting some things project creators 
often do to attempt to create a successful project). 
 56. However, some reward crowdfunding sites, like Indiegogo, do not follow 
an all-or-nothing model, and thus, any amount that is pledged is ultimately 
collected by the creator. See Choose Your Funding Type: Can I Keep My Money?, 
INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/205138007-Choose-
Your-Funding-Type-Can-I-Keep-My-Money- (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating 
that a project can keep the money donated to it even if it does not achieve its goal) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 57. See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 49 (noting the statistics of failed 
projects). 
 58. See infra Part II.B (discussing the efficiencies of crowdfunding). 
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90% of the market’s attention. All in all, reward crowdfunding 
seems like a fairly efficient way to raise capital. 
B. Crowdfunding Under the JOBS Act59 
Securities crowdfunding takes the concept of reward 
crowdfunding and extends it to investments.60 It works just like 
reward crowdfunding except that, instead of receiving a tangible 
reward, like a CD from a band, the financial backers get a share of 
stock or some other financial interest, such as a share in the band’s 
profits on the sale of the CD.61 
This novel method of online investing holds great promise, but 
it also violates the usual legal rules for making a public offer of 
securities.62 For, under the federal Securities Act of 1933,63 an 
entrepreneur is legally required to “register” any shares of stock, 
bonds, or other securities before offering them to the public.64 This 
registration process calls for copious public disclosure about the 
                                                                                                     
59. This Section is adapted from a similar discussion in, Andrew A. 
Schwartz, Crowdfunding Social Enterprise in New Zealand, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Joseph Yockey & Benjamin Means eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Crowdfunding 
Social Enterprise]. 
 60. See 158 Cong. Rec. S1,824-02 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2012) (statement of Sen. 
Merkley) (explaining that securities crowdfunding is based on reward 
crowdfunding of the sort practiced on Kickstarter); Schwartz, Inclusive 
Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (noting that securities crowdfunding was 
spurred by reward crowdfunding).  
 61. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (“Securities 
crowdfunding takes the concept one step further by providing backers with a 
security, such as a share of stock, without registering the securities with the 
authorities.”). 
 62. See id. (“Selling securities in this way does not violate the federal 
securities laws (which generally mandate that one register securities with the 
SEC before offering them to the public) because legal ‘exemptions’ have been put 
into place. . . .”). 
 63. Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–aa 
(2012)).   
 64. See Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your 
Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 918 
(2011) (noting that, under the Securities Act of 1933, a company had to register 
its stock before issuing it). 
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company, the securities to be offered, et cetera, and it is a legal 
mandate for all public offerings.65 
The securities laws expressly allow for “exemptions” to the 
registration requirement, however, and a new exemption for 
crowdfunding was created by the federal government in Title III of 
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 201266 (JOBS Act). 
This statute was passed with bipartisan support, and many states, 
including Colorado and Georgia, have since followed with similar 
legislation.67 The enthusiasm for securities crowdfunding is 
primarily based on the widely shared view that the traditional 
initial public offering (IPO) process in the United States had 
become so onerous and expensive that many worthwhile 
companies either cannot or choose not to obtain funding from the 
public—to the detriment of us all.68 
One reason why IPOs are so expensive is the high cost of 
complying with securities laws and regulations.69 Under 
traditional securities laws, all securities must be first registered 
with the SEC or similar agency before being offered for sale to the 
public.70 This registration process generally requires that the 
company provide full and clear disclosure of the risks of investing 
in the IPO, and then provide ongoing disclosures once the company 
is public.71 Over the years—the American statute dates from the 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 884 (stating that securities must be registered). 
 66. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o (2012)); see Scwhartz, 
Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 663 (“Retail crowdfunding is exempt 
under Title III of the new JOBS Act, accredited crowdfunding is exempt under 
Title II of the JOBS Act, and intrastate crowdfunding is exempt under the 
longstanding intrastate exemption.”). 
 67. See Scwhartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 669 (“[R]oughly 
one-third of states have adopted legislation authorizing securities crowdfunding 
within their borders, including Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Tennessee, and Texas.”). 
 68. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1458 (“[T]he 
costs associated with crowdfunding securities will be so much lower than costs in 
a traditional IPO. . . .”). 
 69. See id. at 1467 (“By offering starkly lower compliance and promotion 
costs than a traditional IPO, crowdfunding greatly reduces the cost of raising 
capital from the public for small entrepreneurs.”). 
 70. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 64, at 918 (noting that ordinary 
securities must be registered before distributed). 
 71. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1466 
(“[R]equir[ing] that the issuer provide full and clear disclosure of the risks and 
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1930s—these disclosure requirements have become increasingly 
demanding thanks to the accumulation of legislative amendments 
and regulatory commands, to the point that the process of going 
public costs several million dollars in legal, accounting, and other 
fees.72 This has discouraged all but the largest and most successful 
companies to conduct an IPO.73 
Securities crowdfunding responds to this problem by 
exempting crowdfunded offerings from the usual registration and 
disclosure requirements for public offerings.74 By eliminating the 
substantial attorney costs, underwriting costs, printing costs, and 
accounting costs associated with the preparation of a registration 
statement, this allows for much lower compliance costs than a 
traditional IPO.75 The company likewise need not comply with the 
ongoing (and costly) reporting requirements for public 
companies.76 
In addition to lower compliance costs, securities crowdfunding 
also offers a much less expensive means of promoting an offering 
of stock.77 An important component of conducting a traditional IPO 
is the so-called “road show.”78 This is a series of in-person meetings 
and presentations to potential investors and which requires the 
hiring of public relations, catering, travel, printing, and many 
                                                                                                     
potential rewards of investing in the securities, and then provide ongoing, 
regular, and event-based disclosures.”). 
 72. See id. at 1467 (“[T]oday, the process of going public costs millions of 
dollars in legal, accounting, and other fees and, in a potentially related 
development, the number of companies electing to do so has shrunk to an all time 
low.”). 
 73. See id. at 1468 (“[A] registered public offering is just too expensive for all 
but the largest issuers.”). 
 74. See id. at 1460 (noting that the CROWDFUND Act exempts 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs from the registration requirement). 
 75. See id. at 1458 (noting that those costs associated with crowdfunding are 
lesser than those associate with a traditional IPO). 
 76. See id. at 1470 (showing that crowdfunding securities are exempt from 
the costly registration and promotion fees of the traditional IPO). 
 77. See id. at 1467 (noting that crowdfunding greatly reduces the cost of 
raising capital). 
 78. See id. at 1470 (discussing the “carefully choreographed procedure called 
a ‘road show’”). 
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other types of consultants and specialists.79 In other words, it is 
expensive.80 
In securities crowdfunding, by contrast, there is no need for a 
physical road show, because it will take place entirely over the 
Internet.81 In this way, the cost of promoting a crowdfunded 
offering will be much lower than an IPO.82 Even so, American 
securities crowdfunding is not entirely free of regulatory red tape 
and the associated cost of compliance.83 
The JOBS Act authorized securities crowdfunding, but also 
imposed many limits and rules on the practice.84 There are hard 
monetary limitations both for companies and for investors.85 
Companies are only allowed to raise up to $1 million each year 
and,86 for investors, the law provides a limit on the amount of 
crowdfunded securities that any one investor may purchase per 
year. The maximum amount an investor may contribute is 
premised on a sliding scale based on income and net worth; for 
most people this will calculate out to about $2,000–$5,000.87 The 
purpose of this investment cap is to protect investors from putting 
more at risk than they can reasonably afford.88 
                                                                                                     
 79. See id. (“The road show is not a legal requirement, but is a practical one, 
given the norms of the major banks that orchestrate IPOs. This is an expensive 
endeavor that calls for public relations, catering, travel, printing, and many other 
types of specialists, each of whom command premium fees.”). 
 80. See id. (noting the extreme cost of a traditional IPO). 
 81. See id. (“Another important factor is the lower cost of promoting a 
crowdfunded issue via the Internet as opposed to an in-person road show.”). 
 82. See id. (noting that the internet saves both time and money for 
crowdfunding companies). 
 83. See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the 
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1573, 1605 (2013) (stating it is still difficult to navigate the compliance 
matters in JOBS). 
 84. See id. (noting that instead of creating “a regulation-free zone,” the JOBS 
Act imposed “a quite heavy and costly set of responsibilities on both issuers and 
any intermediaries that assist them”). 
 85. See id. at 1604 (stating that there is no need to register securities, but 
there are limitations on what can be raised). 
 86. See id. (noting that an issuer can raise only up to one million dollars in 
a transaction). 
 87. See id. (“[T]he main investor protection would have come through 
wealth- and income-based limits on how much any single investor could 
invest. . . .”). 
 88. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1461 (stating 
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Under the JOBS Act, transactions must be executed via a 
financial intermediary registered with the SEC; thus they cannot 
be consummated directly between issuer and investor.89 The 
financial intermediaries (also known as “platforms” or “portals”) 
have numerous responsibilities under the law, including that they 
ensure that each investor reviews certain educational information 
and positively affirms certain statements, such as that they are 
risking the loss of their entire investment.90 Companies may not 
advertise the offering themselves; any solicitations must go 
through the intermediary.91 
Any private domestic company (except “investment 
companies”) may invoke the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding 
exemption.92 Public companies, such as those that trade on the 
New York Stock Exchange, as well as foreign companies, are thus 
excluded.93 Companies must provide numerous disclosures to 
investors, intermediaries and the SEC, including the name, 
address, and website of the company; the names of directors, 
officers, and substantial investors; a description of the business 
and the anticipated business plan; a description of the issuer’s 
financial condition (which varies based on amount raised); a 
description of the purpose and intended use of the proceeds; the 
price of the securities; and a description of the ownership and 
capital structure of the issuer.94 
The JOBS Act provides that companies must state a target for 
their fundraising goal, and are to receive the money only if the 
                                                                                                     
that the caps are for the protection of investors from losing too much money in 
investments with fewer regulations). 
 89. See id. at 1462 (noting how financial intermediaries act for the protection 
of the investor and issuer). 
 90. See id. at 1462–63 (detailing the responsibilities intermediaries have in 
the process). 
 91. See id. at 1464 (“Issuers are prohibited from advertising the offering 
themselves, and any solicitation of the offering must go through the registered 
funding portal.”). 
 92. See Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 83, at 1575 (“[S]ome offerings 
of securities are exempt from ’33 Act requirements because they are ‘private’ or 
otherwise limited in terms of size, scope, or nature of investors being solicited.”). 
 93. See id. (noting that only private companies can be exempt). 
 94. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1464 
(“Although the purpose of the Act is to lower the cost of capital for startups by 
alleviating burdensome disclosure requirements, a crowdfunding business must 
provide some very basic disclosures to the SEC. . . .”).  
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target is met or exceeded.95 During the pendency of an offer, all 
investors have the right to cancel their order at any time.96 If the 
funding campaign succeeds, the company must provide annual 
reports to investors and the SEC for as long as the securities 
remain outstanding.97 Also, crowdfunded securities cannot be 
transferred or sold by investors for one year after the date of 
purchase, unless being transferred to the issuer, as part of an 
offering registered by the SEC, or to an accredited investor or 
family member.98 
Finally, to protect investors, the JOBS Act specifically 
authorizes civil actions for fraud against issuers, directors, and 
officers of companies that mislead crowdfunding investors.99 State 
and federal government authorities, including the SEC, likewise 
are empowered to take action against wrongdoers.100 
The JOBS Act created the basic framework for securities 
crowdfunding in 2012, but many issues were delegated to the SEC 
to flesh out through rulemaking.101 Perhaps because the SEC was 
very busy with other matters, it took the agency several years to 
propose and finalize the regulatory framework for crowdfunding.102 
                                                                                                     
 95. See id. at 1463 (“The intermediary cannot deliver the proceeds of the 
offering to the company until the target amount has been reached or 
exceeded. . . .”). 
 96. See id. (noting that the intermediary “must allow investors the 
opportunity to cancel investment commitments before then”). 
 97. See id. at 1464 (“Finally, following a crowdfunding round, an issuer must 
annually file with the SEC, and make available to investors financial statements 
and a report on the results of operations.”). 
 98. See id. at 1463 (stating that crowdfunding securities cannot be 
transferred within one year “unless being transferred to the issuer, an accredited 
investor, a family member of the purchaser, or as part of an offering registered 
with the SEC”). 
 99. See id. at 1465 (noting a party will be liable if they “make[] an untrue 
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact required to be stated 
or necessary in order to make the statements . . . not misleading”). 
 100. See id. at 1465 (“[T]he SEC is granted ‘examination, enforcement and 
other rulemaking authority’ over funding portals, and presumably retains 
authority to enforce the various statutory and regulatory mandates for both 
issuers and intermediaries.”). 
 101. See id. at 1462 (“Crowdfunding transactions cannot be consummated 
directly between issuer and investor, but rather must be executed via a financial 
intermediary registered with the SEC.”). 
 102. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 669 (“[D]ue to 
competing priorities, the SEC missed the deadline and issued only a preliminary 
THE GATEKEEPERS OF CROWDFUNDING 903 
The SEC published 585 pages of proposed regulations in October 
2013 and invited public comment thereon.103 Two years later, in 
November 2015, the SEC promulgated the final version of 
Regulation Crowdfunding, which weighed in at nearly 700 
pages.104 Securities crowdfunding under the JOBS Act and 
Regulation Crowdfunding finally commenced in May 2016.105 
C. Policy Goals: Efficiency and Inclusivity 
Congress enacted securities crowdfunding in large part to 
benefit entrepreneurs.106 The statute was even called the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act! In that law, signed by 
President Obama, the government sought to create a public 
securities market that would be both efficient and inclusive.107 
“Efficient” in the sense of an effective and low-cost method of 
raising business capital for startup and other small companies.108 
‘Inclusive’ in the sense of a system that is open to any entrepreneur 
who wants to participate—just like in reward crowdfunding.109 
                                                                                                     
proposal in late 2013.”). 
 103. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227). 
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 227 (2017). 
 105. Id. § 200. 
 106. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1466 
(“[C]rowdfunding will emerge as an important, low-cost method of raising 
business capital from the public, thus expanding the opportunity for 
entrepreneurship.”). 
 107. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 666, 671 
(discussing the attention paid to efficiency and inclusivity). 
 108. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 457 (“[I]t will 
liberate startup companies to use peer networks and the Internet to obtain 
modest amounts of capital at low cost.”). 
 109. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 671 (“An 
inclusive environment, broadly defined as one in which ‘all people feel valued and 
respected and have access to the same opportunities,’ can generate positive 
effects.”). There are other policy goals behind crowdfunding, including a wish to 
empower retail investors to buy securities that have traditionally been offered to 
institutional or accredited investors, but the present work is focused on the 
interests of entrepreneurs. 
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1. Efficient Capital Raising 
Startup companies, simply meaning companies that were only 
recently formed, are beneficial to the economy in that they enhance 
innovation, economic growth, and employment.110 They are risky, 
and many eventually go out of business, but those that survive 
commonly “create satisfying employment opportunities 
and . . . products or services that improve our quality of life.”111 
Hence it is in the public interest to encourage the formation and 
development of startup companies. 
Nevertheless, startups commonly have trouble obtaining the 
capital financing they need to get off the ground.112 The usual first 
source for startup financing is from personal savings, or from 
friends and family, but many people have limited savings and lack 
wealthy connections.113 Furthermore, banks are broadly hesitant 
to extend credit to startup companies in their early years, simply 
because the risk is too high.114 Professional early-stage investors, 
such as angel investors and venture capital funds, are potentially 
available, but there is tremendous competition for such funding, 
and they commonly focus on startups in certain geographic areas, 
like Silicon Valley.115 Finally, a startup could solicit investments 
from the public through an IPO.116 That process is heavily 
regulated by the securities laws, however, and compliance costs 
                                                                                                     
 110. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, 
WALL STREET J. (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000 
1424052748703396604576088272112103698 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) 
(“[V]ibrant entrepreneurialism is the key to our global leadership and the success 
of our people.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 111. Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 620. 
 112. See id. at 621 (“This lack of access to financing disproportionately affects 
certain types of entrepreneurs, namely those that are ‘out-of-the-loop’ for one 
reason or another and do not have connections with angel investors or other 
wealthy financiers.”). 
 113. See id. (stating that it is uncommon to have access to a large sum of 
money at the start of a company). 
 114. See id. (noting how startups often resort to the use of credit cards to 
finance their start). 
 115. See id. at 621–22 (commenting on how it can be difficult, and highly 
competitive, to secure financing from a venture capitalist). 
 116. See id. at 622 (noting that it is possible to take the business public 
through an IPO, but that comes with its own set of risks). 
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can easily run to several million dollars, “making an IPO 
economically infeasible for nearly all early-stage startups.”117 
Based on these difficulties, Congress saw a need to create a 
simple and low-cost method of capital-raising for startup 
companies, and decided to adapt the crowdfunding concept to serve 
this purpose.118 Thus, the first policy goal of securities 
crowdfunding is to provide startup companies with an efficient way 
to raise capital from the public.119 The exemption to the securities 
laws allows startups to sell stock or other securities to the public 
in a simple, low-cost manner, and without having to comply with 
the heavy legal, regulatory and practical costs of issuing registered 
securities.120 
2. Inclusive Entrepreneurship 
Securities crowdfunding was also designed to promote an 
inclusive vision of entrepreneurship.121 The traditional way to 
obtain startup business capital has long been through asking 
friends and family, angel investors and venture capitalists.122 But 
what about entrepreneurs of modest means, without a rich uncle, 
and who lack wealthy friends? What about entrepreneurs who live 
far from Silicon Valley?123 Unfortunately, entrepreneurs who are 
                                                                                                     
 117. Id. 
 118. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC 
Rulemaking Under the JOBS Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 43, 46 (2013) (“The 
whole crowdfunding project depends on a very simple and inexpensive process for 
offering securities.”). 
 119. See id. at 44 (“[T]he Act seeks to create an ultralow-cost method for 
startup companies, small business, farmers, and others. . . .”). 
 120. See id. at 47 (“The Act provides a new means for companies to raise 
capital from investors by establishing an exemption to the Securities Act of 1933 
for crowdfunded securities.”). 
 121. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 673 (“One core 
pillar of securities crowdfunding is the idea of an inclusive system that invites all 
investors to participate.”). 
 122. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 621 (“The traditional 
first source for entrepreneurial financing is from the entrepreneur’s friends and 
family, as well as their own personal savings.”). 
 123. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
283, 283–84 (2013) [hereinafter Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding] (noting that 
most investors live in major metropolitan cities); accord Calida Smylie, Should 
Regulators Increase the Equity Crowdfunding Limit?, NAT’L BUS. REV., July 1, 
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‘out of the loop’ for one reason or another appear to have a difficult 
time getting startup financing. This includes women and racial 
minorities,124 as well as young entrepreneurs125 and those from 
rural areas.126 
Crowdfunding—being entirely Internet-based—is supposed to 
give everyone the opportunity to try to raise capital from the 
crowd, regardless of what they look like, how old they are, or where 
they are from.127 As President Obama said when he signed the 
JOBS Act, “[f]or startups and small businesses, this bill is a 
potential game changer,” Obama said at a White House signing 
ceremony flanked by lawmakers from both parties. “Startups and 
small business will now have access to a big new pool of potential 
investors, namely the American people.”128 The inclusive vision is 
that “anyone who can convince the public he has a good business 
idea can become an entrepreneur” through crowdfunding.129  
In short, a second key policy goal of securities crowdfunding in 
the United States was to create an inclusive system that would 
give anyone with a business idea the opportunity to list her 
                                                                                                     
2016 [hereinafter Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Limit?] (“[E]arly stage companies 
are basically left with the options of funds and high net worth individuals, which 
can be an obscure and fragmented market to navigate if you’re not well 
connected.”). 
 124. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 622 (“[T]his problem 
appears to be exacerbated for women and racial minorities.”). 
 125. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 515, 
516 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding] (noting it is difficult 
for teenagers to secure start-up financing). 
 126. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 623 (noting that 
people in rural areas can often have a harder time receiving funding from venture 
capitalists or angel investors). 
 127. See id. at 624 (“Not just those in Silicon Valley; not just those with 
wealthy friends; not just those with connections. Crowdfunding will be open to 
anyone. . . .”); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities 
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 104 (“Crowdfunding . . . gives poorer 
entrepreneurs whose friends and family lack the wealth to provide seed capital 
somewhere else to turn.”). 
 128. Alexandra Alper, Obama Signs Bill to Boost Business Startups, REUTERS 
(Apr. 5, 2012, 3:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jobsact/obama-
signs-bill-to-boost-business-startups-idUSBRE83414F20120405 (last visited Jan. 
11, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. See Bradford, supra note 127, at 10; see also id. at 101 (“Crowdfunding 
allows an entrepreneur to publish her request for funding to the entire 
world. . . .”). 
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business on a crowdfunding website and solicit investments from 
the American people.130 As illustrated below, however, this 
radically inclusive vision of crowdfunding was so threatening to 
efficiency that it was softened, and nearly overturned, by the 
SEC.131 
D. Tension Between Inclusivity and Efficiency—Regulatory 
History 
Securities crowdfunding has a fundamental tension at its core 
between inclusivity and efficiency, and the two goals must be 
balanced or traded off against one another. The goal of an inclusive 
marketplace, in the sense that there are no gatekeepers and any 
entrepreneur can pitch directly to the crowd, was part of the 
original vision of securities crowdfunding.132 The SEC, in the draft 
regulations it released for public comment in 2013, operationalized 
this policy goal by denying platforms the power to curate or screen 
the issuers listing on their site.133 This sweeping notion of a fully 
inclusive securities marketplace, where any and every 
entrepreneur was to be given a chance, was subsequently 
squelched by the SEC.134 The SEC recognized it had to make a 
tradeoff between inclusivity and efficiency and ultimately decided 
to advance efficiency at the expense of inclusivity.135 The final 
version of the regulations do empower platforms to curate and 
                                                                                                     
 130. See Darian Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 
1481, 1489 (2017) (“[F]unding portals were originally to play a passive role in the 
crowdfunding process. They were not designed to guide investors toward the best 
startups—that was left up to the ‘crowd.’”). 
 131. See infra notes 222–236 and accompanying text (discussing the limits 
the SEC placed on securities crowdfunding in the United States). 
 132. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 673 (“Inclusivity 
is essential to crowdfunding and drives the theory underlying the form.”). 
 133. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,485–87 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227). 
 134. See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 672 (noting the 
SEC, as well as scholars, believe “[t]he essence of the concept is the creation of an 
inclusive market where ordinary investors will be able to make investments that 
have traditionally been the exclusive purview of wealthy and connected 
investors”). 
 135. See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text (discussing how 
Congress limited inclusiveness in favor of efficiency). 
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select which entrepreneurs to include, and which to exclude.136 
This section recounts the regulatory process where this important 
change was made. 
In 2013, the SEC published its initial version of Regulation 
Crowdfunding and solicited comments from the public.137 Two 
years later, in 2015, the SEC promulgated the final version of 
Regulation Crowdfunding, incorporating changes suggested by 
public commenters.138 Among the most significant changes 
between the proposed and the final regulations was the alteration 
of Rule 402(b)(1).139 
Rule 402(b)(1) governs whether and to what extent a funding 
portal is permitted to decide which companies to allow to list on its 
site.140 Under the original version of the Rule, funding portals were 
to play “an almost completely passive role.”141 If an entrepreneur 
wanted to post their business and solicit investments from the 
crowd, a funding portal had to allow her on its site, regardless of 
the portal’s view of the company or its prospects.142 Indeed, Rule 
402(b)(1), as originally proposed, specifically stated that “a funding 
portal may not deny access to an issuer based on the advisability 
of investing in the issuer or its offering.”143 This was a radically 
inclusive rule: Every entrepreneur had to be included, and none 
could be excluded. 144 
                                                                                                     
 136. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (2017) (allowing discretion over who can 
use a platform and who cannot). 
 137. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,428. 
 138. 17 C.F.R. § 227. 
 139. Compare Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (detailing the proposed rule), with 17 C.F.R. § 
227.402(b)(1) (detailing the final rule). 
 140. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (“A funding portal may . . . [d]etermine 
whether and under what terms to allow an issuer to offer and sell securities in 
reliance on section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act.”). 
 141. Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1496; see also Schwartz, Crowdfunding 
Securities, supra note 15, at 1462 n.25 (stating the portal’s only purpose was to 
connect buyers and sellers, and nothing else). 
 142. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,560 (“A funding portal 
may . . . apply objective criteria to limit the securities offered in reliance on 
Section 4(a)(6) . . . .”). 
 143. Crowdfunding, Release No. 33-9479, 107 S.E.C. Docket 2728 (proposed 
Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2013/33-9470.pdf. 
 144. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1481 (“Funding portals were originally 
conceived of as almost completely passive entities who could not subjectively 
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The statutory basis for the SEC’s proposed Rule 402(b)(1) was 
found in a portion of the JOBS Act that prohibited funding portals 
from “offer[ing] investment advice or recommendations.”145 The 
SEC took the view, at least at first, that to allow a portal to pick 
and choose who to permit on its site would be an implicit form of 
advice that the issuers it selected were worthy investments, and 
those that it rejected were not.146 
The proposed Rule 402(b)(1) did have two exceptions to this 
basic prohibition on screening issuers: First, the portal was 
permitted to exclude an issuer that “present[ed] the potential for 
fraud or otherwise raise[d] investor protection concerns.”147 
Second, the portal could have used “objective criteria” to select the 
issuers it allowed on its site.148 So, a portal could have specialized 
in technology companies,149 or those from a certain geographic 
area,150 and exclude any issuers who did not fit the bill. But if an 
issuer did come within the objective criteria, the portal would be 
forced to include it, regardless of what it thought of the company 
and its prospects.151 If a portal devoted itself to, say, women-owned 
businesses, then it would have had to allow any and every 
woman-owned business to list on its site. 
When the SEC put out its proposed Regulation 
Crowdfunding for public comment, Rule 402(b)(1) received a wave 
of criticism.152 Just like a regular stock exchange, funding portals 
                                                                                                     
‘curate’ (or screen) the startups that wished to list on the sites.”).  
 145. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80)(A) (2012) (defining funding portal as “any 
person acting as an intermediary in a transaction involving the offer or sale of 
securities for the account of others, solely pursuant to Section 4(6) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77d(6))”). 
 146. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,486 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (“[A] funding portal may not use criteria based 
on an assessment of the merits or the shortcomings of a particular issuer or 
offering. In particular, a funding portal may not deny access to an issuer based 
on the advisability of investing in the issuer or its offering.”). 
 147. Id. at 66,463. 
 148. Id. at 66,486. 
 149. See id. (including “business segment” as a permissible objective 
criterion).  
 150. See id. (including “geographic location” as a permissible objective 
criterion).   
 151. See id. (explaining that the objective criteria were designed to prevent 
the appearance that the funding portal was providing investment advice). 
 152. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,462 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be 
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have a fundamental business need to cultivate and protect a sound 
reputation among investors, otherwise people may not be willing 
to invest their money on the site.153 Had Rule 402(b)(1) gone into 
effect as proposed, it would have been impossible for a funding 
portal to generate and protect its reputation for only listing 
companies with good prospects.154 Thus by forcing a portal to 
include every entrepreneur who asked, the SEC’s proposed rule 
would have undermined “the viability of the funding portal 
industry, and thus the crowdfunding market” as a whole.155 
In essence, the commenters were concerned that the SEC’s 
proposal privileged inclusivity over efficiency (although they did 
not put it in precisely these terms) and the SEC ultimately 
agreed.156 The SEC concurred that the system would only work, or 
would at least work much better, if funding portals had the power 
to select which companies to include, and which to exclude, from 
its site.157 
                                                                                                     
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (“We received a significant number of comments on 
the ability of a funding portal to limit the offerings on its platform . . . .”). 
 153. See EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER 
IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE 29 (2015) (“A stock exchange that fails to provide 
assurances or attempts to stack the deck in favor of its members at the expense 
of investors will attract fewer investors in its market in the long run.”); id. at 81 
(“By providing extra assurances to investors, the New York Stock 
Exchange . . . increases the demand for its market. Here the exchange acts as a 
reputational intermediary, providing the equivalent of a Good Housekeeping Seal 
of Approval on listed firms.” (citing JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE 
REPUTATION: HOW INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET 199–210 
(2013))). 
 154. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,462 
Commenters asserted that a funding portal’s ability to limit the 
offerings on its platform is important for investor protection. They 
stated that funding portals should be permitted to screen out clearly 
unprepared or ill-conceived offerings, and should be permitted to limit 
offerings on their platforms to issuers that are “crowdfund-ready”. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. (“We acknowledge the concerns raised by commenters that the 
proposed rules could otherwise have unduly restricted a funding portal’s ability 
to limit offerings conducted on its platform, and we are modifying the safe harbor 
contained in Rule 402(b)(1) to address these concerns.”). 
 157. See id. (“Specifically, we are revising Rule 402(b)(1) to read that a 
funding portal may ‘[d]etermine whether and under what terms to allow an issuer 
to offer and sell securities . . . through its platform, provided that the funding 
portal otherwise complies with Regulation Crowdfunding . . . .’”). 
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The SEC was probably correct in concluding that a ban on 
platform curation would have led to significant inefficiencies for all 
market participants: Investors would have had to wade through 
tons of unsuitable investments in order to find the ones they like.158 
Investments would have been spread very thinly among many 
issuers, leading to many failed campaigns, as the combination of 
the investor cap and the all-or-nothing rule would make it difficult 
for any given issuer to reach its target amount. Platforms, who 
generally are compensated through a “success fee” paid by a 
company that meets its target, would have had to charge higher 
fees to account for the time and resources they waste on the many 
unsuccessful campaigns. And since the overall success rate would 
be relatively low in an un-curated marketplace, a large percentage 
of issuers would have wasted their time and effort trying to get 
funding. Without going any further, it is clear that the SEC was 
likely right in concluding that the proposed version of Rule 
402(b)(1) would have led to massive inefficiency and perhaps a 
total breakdown in the system.159 
The agency accordingly revised Rule 402(b)(1) to expressly 
allow a funding portal to “exercise its discretion . . . to limit the 
offerings and issuers that it allows on its platform.”160 Its revised 
version of Rule 402(b)(1) states, in no uncertain terms, “A funding 
portal may . . . [d]etermine whether and under what terms to allow 
an issuer to offer and sell securities . . . through its platform.”161 
Thus the final Regulation Crowdfunding, which is presently in 
effect, authorizes and empowers funding portals to exclude what 
                                                                                                     
 158. See also Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428, 66,487 (proposed Nov. 5, 
2013) (providing search functions to help users to “search, sort, or categorize” 
offerings to more efficiently find desired offerings).  
 159. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1498 (quoting other commentator’s 
contention that failure to change the rule “could have spelled disaster for the 
nascent crowdfunding industry” (quoting Evan Engstrom, The Good and the Bad 
in the SEC’s New Crowdfunding Rules, ENGINE (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.engine.is/news/issues/the-good-and-the-bad-in-the-secs-new-
crwdfunding-rules/6124  (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review))). 
 160. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,463 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227). 
 161. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (2017). 
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they perceived to be low-quality companies with poor prospects or 
too much risk.162 
This important change between the SEC’s proposed and final 
regulations is telling. The radically inclusive vision presented in 
the proposed Rule 402(b)(1) was that anyone with a business idea 
would be granted the legal right to present her idea to the crowd 
and ask for their financial backing.163 You do not need to impress 
the VCs, the angels, the banks, the “guys in suits”—you get your 
shot. Regardless of whether you are a teenager,164 a racial 
minority,165 or live far from Silicon Valley,166 everyone and every 
idea was welcome. 
But this “revolutionary” idea of a totally inclusive marketplace 
for entrepreneurial finance was snuffed out without even being 
given a chance.167 The SEC concluded, again, probably correctly, 
that some level of exclusivity is needed for crowdfunding to work; 
total inclusivity is simply too inefficient to function.168 Congress 
may have had dual purposes when it authorized securities 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,463 (“[W]e are providing funding 
portals with broad discretion to determine whether and under what 
circumstances to allow an issuer to offer and sell securities through its 
platform . . . .”). 
 163. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,486 (requiring that limitations of 
funding portals use objective criteria “required to be reasonably designed to result 
in a broad selection of issuers”). 
 164. See Schwartz, Teenage Crowdfunding, supra note 125, at 516 (describing 
how the CROWDFUND Act opened crowdfunding opportunities to those under 
age twenty-one). 
 165. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 623 (referencing 
recent literature showing that “most startups founded by African-Americans 
receive little or no outside financing from any source”). 
 166. See id. (highlighting the geographical disadvantage of those who do not 
live in communities with large potential funding basis); Schwartz, Rural 
Crowdfunding, supra note 123, at 283 (discussing the localization of early stage 
investment and its impact on rural entrepreneurs). 
 167. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1485 (observing that crowdfunding’s 
move toward an expert-based system resembles a model closer to the existent 
angel and venture capital models). 
 168. See id. at 1496 (arguing that “expert curation is optimal in startup 
investing”). Indeed, one thoughtful commentator has repeatedly suggested that 
crowdfunding’s efficiency would be greatly improved if the SEC went even further 
than the current Rule 402(b)(1) and allowed even more curation and exclusivity. 
See id. at 1496 (advocating that “funding portals should be allowed to do more 
screening of startups” (citing Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market 
for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 603–06 (2015))). 
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crowdfunding—both efficiency and inclusivity—but the SEC 
privileged one over the other in its final Rule 402(b)(1).169 And this 
makes sense, as an inclusive system isn’t worth much if nobody 
actually uses it. In any event, the present system of American 
securities crowdfunding prioritizes efficiency over inclusivity. 
Certain minor aspects designed to promote inclusivity for 
entrepreneurs do remain part of the SEC’s final regulatory 
framework. For one thing, the SEC’s final regulations still do 
require platforms to use objective criteria when highlighting 
offerings within the platform.170 Thus they may not put a set of 
recommended investments on the home page and relegate the rest 
to sub-pages.171 Similarly, platforms must also use objective 
criteria when providing search functions on its site.172 However, 
these aspects of the rules are obviously of no use to a company who 
is excluded from the site altogether. Thus, the system is, at its core, 
not as inclusive of entrepreneurs as was originally framed. 
In conclusion, the SEC’s final rules prioritize efficiency over 
inclusivity in that they allow portals to screen and reject 
companies that they do not want to list.173 The SEC changed Rule 
402(b)(1) because it understood that it had to make a trade-off 
between efficiency and inclusivity. The agency’s counterpart in 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,462 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 227) (explaining the SEC’s response to the public 
comments with regards to granting funding portals discretion over limiting 
platform accessibility). 
 170. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(2) (2017). 
 171. See id § 227.402(b)(2)(ii) (“[T]he funding portal may not highlight an 
issuer or offering based on the advisability of investing in the issuer or its 
offering . . . .”). 
 172. See id. § 227.402(b)(3) (“A funding portal may . . . [p]rovide search 
functions or other tools that investors can use to search, sort, or categorize the 
offerings available through the funding portal’s platform according to objective 
criteria . . . .”). 
 173. Cf. STRINGHAM, supra note 153, at 30  
The terms “closing it to ‘outsiders’” and “exclusion” have negative 
connotations to many, but a voluntary association would not be 
voluntary if everyone were forced together against their will. . . . Even 
though exclusion is an important part of a social system based on 
voluntary relations, the system would be much more inclusive 
overall. . . . [E]xclusion is nothing more than people deciding with 
whom they want to interact. 
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New Zealand, however, never had to make that trade-off, as the 
next Part will discuss.174 
III. Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand 
While the idea of crowdfunding securities originated in the 
United States and the federal JOBS Act of 2012 provided the first 
template for this new form, other countries quickly took steps to 
emulate this American innovation.175 New Zealand in particular 
took the idea and ran with it, to the point that it had its market up 
and running two years ahead of the Americans.176 This Part 
discusses the distinctive New Zealand model of crowdfunding in 
advance of Part IV, which will compare the New Zealand and 
United States regimes in terms of efficiency and inclusivity. 
A. New Zealand as Comparator 
Much of the remainder of this Article will compare and 
contrast the crowdfunding laws and markets in New Zealand and 
the United States. This sort of analysis depends, of course, on the 
two countries being comparable. Despite obvious differences 
between them—New Zealand is a small island nation with less 
than five million people, including a large Polynesian population, 
located in the South Pacific177—they are actually quite similar in 
                                                                                                     
 174. See infra Part III (discussing the evolution of crowdfunding in New 
Zealand). 
 175. See Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the U.S. and Abroad: 
What to Expect When You’re Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 427, 427–49, 437–
438 (2013) (suggesting that crowdfunding through established portals emerged 
contemporaneously in Europe and tracing the crowdfunding phenomenon’s 
growth around the world).  
 176. See Dehner & Kong, supra note 15, at 437 (“New Zealand equity and 
lending based crowdfunding laws became effective in April of 2014.”); Ibrahim, 
supra note 130, at 1488 (noting that although the JOBS Act was passed in 2012, 
the market set-up was delayed until the SEC could implement the final rules in 
2016). 
 177. See World Factbook: New Zealand, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2017), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_nz.html 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2017) (last visited Jan. 1, 2018) (providing general 
statistical information about New Zealand) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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their history and legal structure: Both began as British colonies, 
both speak English, both are developed countries with a 
democratic form of government and a legal system based on the 
common law, both even use dollars as their currency.178 
While comparative analyses are never perfect, many legal 
scholars have concluded that the similarities between New 
Zealand and the United States are close enough to make at least 
rough and broad comparisons between them.179 This is true in 
many areas of law. Scholars of tort law, in particular, have 
frequently compared the United States tort system with the rather 
different approach that New Zealand has followed since the 
1970s.180 In addition, many leading American tort law casebooks 
“contain extensive treatment of New Zealand’s system,”181 a 
further indication that New Zealand is an appropriate legal 
comparator for the United States with respect to tort law.182 
                                                                                                     
 178. See DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, FAIRNESS AND FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF TWO 
OPEN SOCIETIES, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES 27, 476 (2012)  
The United States and New Zealand are both open societies and have 
been so for many generations. Each in its own way has a democratic 
polity, a mixed-enterprise economy, a pluralist culture, a strong 
commitment to human rights, and a firm belief in the rule of law. Both 
of these open systems encourage individual people to make their own 
choices. They also share many values in common, including liberty and 
freedom, fairness and justice. 
 179. See infra notes 180–188 (comparing New Zealand and the United States 
in various areas of the law). 
 180. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 187, 198 (2008) (discussing “Tort Law in America: Lessons from New 
Zealand”); Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort 
Principles Rule, O.K.?, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (1995) (discussing “lessons 
for American [tort-law] reformers from the New Zealand experience”); Richard S. 
Miller, An Analysis and Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand’s Accident 
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 1070, 1070 (1993) (noting continued 
interest in New Zealand’s no-fault accident compensation scheme as a possible 
alternative for how the United States handles personal injury torts); Craig 
Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CAL. L. 
REV. 976, 976 (1985) (exploring the role of deterrence in discussions of replacing 
the U.S. tort law system with something akin to New Zealand’s no fault insurance 
system); Marc A. Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the 
United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN. L. REV. 653, 654 (1975) 
(emphasizing that the similarities between the U.S. and New Zealand are a 
reason to consider New Zealand’s experience with its new tort law system for 
changing the American system). 
 181. Palmer, supra note 180, at 1119. 
 182. See id. at 1119 n.6 (listing torts casebooks that discuss New Zealand law, 
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Beyond torts, American legal scholars have frequently claimed 
that New Zealand’s experience holds lessons for various areas of 
United States law including antitrust,183 family law,184 criminal 
law,185 labor law,186 patent law,187 and many more.188 
                                                                                                     
including those authored by Richard Epstein, George Christie and James Meeks, 
and William Prosser). 
 183. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from 
Antitrust and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 128–29 (2000) (discussing lessons 
for the United States to draw from New Zealand’s “advanced” antitrust law); 
William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 
11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 189 (1994) (claiming that “the New Zealand experience 
will have considerable relevance to the American [antitrust law in the] 
telecommunications arena”). 
 184. See generally MARK HARDIN ET AL., FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES IN CHILD 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF NEW ZEALAND 
(1996) (advocating for the application of the New Zealand family group 
conferences model in U.S. family law). 
 185. See generally Carol A. Brook et. al., A Comparative Look at Plea 
Bargaining in Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, and the United States, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1147 (2016) (comparing the nature and effects of plea 
bargaining in the United States with other countries, including New Zealand). 
 186. See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, Solidarity Forever? Unions and Bargaining 
Representation Under New Zealand’s Employment Contracts Act, 18 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1995) (“In 1991, New Zealand enacted the Employment 
Contracts Act (ECA), legislation that is premised on a completely different model 
than U.S. labor law. It affords a rich opportunity to study the impact of some key 
ideas advanced for labor law reform [in the U.S.].”). 
 187. See, e.g., Erin E. Block, The End of the “Wild West” for Software Patents—
Does the Patents Act 2013 Change New Zealand’s Treatment of Software Patents 
from Permissive to Restrictive?, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 141, 154–56 (2015) 
(comparing the patentatibility of computer programs under United States and 
New Zealand law); Todd Martin, Patentability of Methods of Medical Treatment: 
A Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 381, 410 (2000) (same). 
 188. See, e.g., Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New 
Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 
101, 149–59 (2002) (comparing American defamation law with New Zealand’s); 
Ruth W. Pritchard-Kelly, A Comparison Between Spectrum Auctions in the United 
States and New Zealand, 20 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 155, 155 (1996) (explaining 
how the U.S. learned from New Zealand’s experience in setting up an auction 
system for telecommunications licensing); Michael C. Blumm, Native Fishing 
Rights and Environmental Protection in North America and New Zealand: A 
Comparative Analysis of Profits à Prendre and Habitat Servitudes, 8 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 1 (1989) (examining native fishing rights in America with British Columbia 
and New Zealand); see also, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Comparing United States and 
New Zealand Legal Education: Are U.S. Law Schools Too Good?, 30 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 32 (1997) (comparing the two nations’ legal educational 
systems). 
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The comparison between the two countries is especially 
appropriate when it comes to securities regulation in general, and 
crowdfunding in particular.189 New Zealand’s securities law is, on 
the whole, a close cousin to the United States. They both rely on a 
central national regulator (the SEC and the FMA) to keep close 
tabs on the public securities markets (the New York Stock 
Exchange, NASDAQ, et cetera, and the New Zealand Exchange 
(NZX)).190 Like the United States,191 New Zealand has an extensive 
history of precisely the sort of fraud and wrongdoing that securities 
law is designed to combat.192 In New Zealand during the 2000s, for 
instance, there was a rash of so-called “finance companies” that 
sold unregistered securities to huge numbers of “mum and dad” 
investors and then went bust.193 Hence both countries have an 
elaborate set of mandatory disclosure rules for publicly traded 
companies,194 as well as analogous exemptions from those rules, 
                                                                                                     
 189. See infra notes 190–200 (drawing similarities in the regulatory 
construction and rules in New Zealand and the United States). 
 190. See generally VICTORIA STACE, ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT 
REGULATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (2014) (describing securities regulation in 
New Zealand). 
 191. See generally EDWARD J. BALLEISEN, FRAUD: AN AMERICAN HISTORY FROM 
BARNUM TO MADOFF (2017) (tracing the prevalent history of fraud in American 
businesses).  
 192. See STACE, ET AL., supra note 190, at 3 (“In New Zealand, a rich 
jurisprudence on securities law has emerged in the wake of the GFC [(Global 
Financial Crisis)] and finance company collapses, with many prominent cases 
that have attracted media attention—more often for the villains than the 
heroes.”). 
 193. See Nicola Won, Regulation of Finance Companies: Coming Out of the 
Shadows, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 110, 110 (2015) 
The finance company collapses from 2006 onwards had a major 
financial impact on New Zealand investors (and taxpayers). The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Reserve Bank) has calculated that 45 
finance companies involving over 170,000 investors (4% of the national 
population; the equivalent of about 12 million Americans) failed 
between 2006 and 2011, with an estimated $6 billion in outstanding 
deposit liabilities. 
See also Mark A. Fox et. al., Corporate Governance Research on New Zealand 
Listed Companies, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (2012) (“[T]here has been a 
rolling set of corporate failures in [New Zealand’s] finance company sector since 
the global financial crisis .  . . .”); id. at 4 (mentioning the “raft of finance company 
failures in New Zealand”). 
 194. See Fox et. al., supra note 193, at 5 (suggesting that one reason for the 
collapse of so many finance companies was that they were “not subject to the 
discipline of the New Zealand Exchange Listing Rules” especially “the continuous 
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including the commonly used accredited (“wholesale” in New 
Zealand) investor exemption.195 
Finally, and most relevant to the present discussion, New 
Zealand expressly modeled its legal regime for crowdfunding on 
the American JOBS Act.196 The New Zealand Parliament, guided 
by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), 
carefully studied the JOBS Act upon its enactment in 2012,197 and 
adopted a similar scheme in the Financial Markets Conduct Act of 
2013.198 But as the next section will show, New Zealand’s 
crowdfunding law did not follow the American model in every 
respect.199 To the contrary, New Zealand’s Parliament, upon the 
recommendations of MBIE, made significant changes to the JOBS 
Act,200 thereby setting up a useful comparison of the two 
crowdfunding laws. 
                                                                                                     
disclosure regime that applies to listed companies”). 
 195. Compare STACE, ET AL., supra note 190, at 131 (“An offer of financial 
products to a wholesale investor does not require . . . disclosure. This reflects the 
generally accepted policy rationale that wholesale investors are capable of looking 
after themselves, by reason of their expertise or experience in relation to financial 
matters.” (citing the New Zealand Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, pts 1–9 
(N.Z.))), and id. at 134 (explaining that the definition of wholesale investor 
includes individuals with a net worth that exceeds NZ$5 million), with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d(a)(5) (2012) (exempting offerings of securities “solely to one or more 
accredited investors”), and 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e) (2017) (defining “accredited 
investor” as including individuals with a net worth that exceeds $1 million). 
 196. See MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT, FINANCIAL 




pdf (“The United States has recently introduced a crowd-funding exemption from 
its Securities Act, as part of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (‘JOBS 
Act’) . . . . We propose [in the FMCA] to provide an [analogous] exception for 
crowd-funding . . . .”); id. at 240–41 (taking note of specific portions of the JOBS 
Act and discussing whether, and to what extent, New Zealand should copy the 
American legal scheme for crowdfunding). 
 197. See id. at 240–41 (referencing the JOBS Act requirements and proposing 
questions for comment based upon enacting similar requirements). 
 198. See Interview with James Hartley, Manager, Fin. Mkts. Policy, N.Z. 
Ministry of Bus., Innovation & Emp’t, in Auckland, N.Z. (Apr. 4, 2017) (recounting 
legislative history). 
 199. See infra Part III.B (describing how the American system imposes more 
restrictions on the practice of crowdfunding). 
 200. See infra Part III.B (explaining that New Zealand consciously omitted 
mandatory disclosure and investment cap provisions found in the JOBS Act). 
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In sum, while New Zealand and the United States are not 
precisely the same in every way, they appear to be close enough for 
the present purpose, which is to provide a broad and rough 
comparison of their crowdfunding laws and markets.  
B. Crowdfunding Under the FMC 
Once the United States enacted the JOBS Act in 2012, other 
countries sought to emulate the crowdfunding provisions of Title 
III.201 One of the first movers was New Zealand.202 The Parliament 
there took Title III as a model for its own equity crowdfunding law, 
which it passed in 2013 as part of a massive overhaul of securities 
law called the Financial Markets Conduct Act (FMCA).203 
Regulations were promptly issued the next year204 and the New 
Zealand equity crowdfunding205 market opened for business in 
2014, two years ahead of the United States.206 
New Zealand’s model of crowdfunding is broadly similar to the 
JOBS Act, although the New Zealand version is simpler and more 
                                                                                                     
 201. See Weinstein, supra note 175, at 427–49 (looking at the expansion of 
crowdfunding outside the United States).  
 202. See Dehner & Kong, supra note 15, at 437 (observing that despite 
starting their legislation after the JOBS Act, New Zealand’s laws became effective 
in 2014). 
 203. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (documenting that New 
Zealand modeled its crowdfunding law on Title III of the JOBS Act). 
204.  See Financial Markets Conduct Regulations, MINISTRY BUS., INNOVATION, 
& EMP’T, http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/business-law/financial-
markets-conduct-act/regulations (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) (“The full Financial 
Markets Conduct Regulations (FMC Regulations) were made on 3 November 2014 
and came into force on 1 December 2014.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 205. United States law “permits any ‘security’ to be crowdfunded” while New 
Zealand allows equity securities to be crowdfunded through a “crowd funding 
service” and allows debt securities to be crowdfunded through a “peer-to-peer 
lending service.” Compare Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 
1482 (observing that in the U.S. system, most expect issuers to sell stock in their 
companies, but other securities, such as bonds, notes, or other debt instruments, 
could also be issued), with Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, reg. 
185(1) (N.Z.) (placing the focus on equity crowdfunding, because peer-to-peer 
lending is predominantly used by individuals, rather than companies). 
 206. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (comparing the relative start 
dates for the crowdfunding regulatory schemes in each nation). 
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liberal (“light-handed,” as they would say)207 in that it imposes very 
few restrictions on the practice.208 In the United States, Congress 
included mandatory disclosure and an investment cap in the JOBS 
Act to prevent investors both from fraud and from losing more than 
they could afford.209 The New Zealand Parliament consciously 
deleted these features from its version of equity crowdfunding.210 
There are only a few hard and fast rules in New Zealand 
crowdfunding. For one, all listings must be hosted by an online 
“platform” licensed by the Financial Markets Authority (FMA), the 
New Zealand equivalent of the SEC.211 For another, issuers may 
only sell up to NZ$2 million (~$1.4 million) in equity per year 
through crowdfunding.212 
Beyond those few rules, New Zealand’s law is spare and 
light-handed. There is no rule mandating any certain disclosures, 
and the FMA does not review or approve of individual offerings.213 
Rather, it is up to each private platform to decide which companies 
to list on its site and what, if any, disclosure to demand from them, 
without direct input or oversight from the FMA.214 
                                                                                                     
 207. See, e.g., Calida Smylie, Are Equity Crowdfunding Regulations too 
Light-Handed?, NAT’L BUS. REV., June 12, 2017 [hereinafter Smylie, 
Crowdfunding Regulations too Light-Handed?]; see also, e.g., Clear Comm’s, Ltd. 
v. Telecomm. Corp. of N.Z., CP590/91, 22 Dec. 1992 (using the term in the 
antitrust context). 
 208. See Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Limit?, supra note 123 (describing 
New Zealand’s crowdfunding regime as “relatively liberal” (quoting New Zealand 
government official)); Interview with Colin Magee, Head of Conduct, N.Z. Fin. 
Markets Auth., in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 24, 2017). 
 209. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1461–62, 1464 
(explaining these two provisions of the CROWDFUND Act). 
 210. Interview with James Hartley, supra note 198. 
 211. See Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, reg. 186(1) (N.Z.) 
(providing the eligibility requirements for licensing from the FMA for crowd 
funding service providers). 
 212. See id. reg. 186(1)(g) (requiring service providers must have procedures 
to ensure issuers do not raise more than $2 million (New Zealand dollars) per 
year).  
 213. See Taylor Burgess & Caitlin Hollings, Legislation Note, Financial 
Markets Conduct Act 2013, 20 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 290, 295 (2014) (explaining 
the FMA’s exclusion of peer-to-peer lending platforms from disclosure 
requirements and use of a licensing process to provide protections for the general 
public). 
 214. See id. (noting that the FMA utilizes a licensing process for the platforms 
as its main form of supervision). 
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Another key difference between the crowdfunding laws in the 
United States and New Zealand is that the JOBS Act imposes an 
annual cap on the amount that any individual may invest through 
crowdfunding.215 The precise amount depends on one’s income and 
net worth, but for the average person it would work out to be about 
$3,000-$5,000 in all crowdfunding companies each year, and only 
slightly more for even very wealthy investors.216 An investor cap is 
a standard practice in crowdfunding laws around the world—
Australia’s statute includes a cap of AU$10,000 per company,217 for 
instance—and it is there to protect investors from losing more than 
they can afford. New Zealand, in its light-handed way, has no 
investor cap at all!218 People are free to invest as much as they wish 
in as many companies as they wish. 
C. Policy Goal: Efficiency (and Not Inclusivity) 
New Zealand’s crowdfunding law is directed at the singular 
policy goal of efficiency, and is not directly concerned with 
advancing an inclusive model of entrepreneurship.219 New 
Zealand’s crowdfunding law, unlike the JOBS Act, was not 
intended to advance the cause of inclusive entrepreneurship.220 
                                                                                                     
 215. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1461 (stating 
the U.S. law set limitation upon both issuers and investors). 
 216. The JOBS Act defines the annual investor cap for those whose annual 
income or net worth is below $100,000 as the greater of $2,000 or 5% of their 
annual income or net worth (10% for people with an annual income and net worth 
over $100,000, up to an absolute cap of $100,000 per year). 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012). To offer an example, someone with an annual income of 
$500,000 and a net worth of $5 million may legally invest up to $50,000 per year 
(10% of the lesser) in all crowdfunding issuers. 
 217. See Corporation Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 ss 
738ZC (Austl.) (setting the Australian investment cap). 
 218. This was a conscious departure from the model of the JOBS Act. 
Interview with James Hartley, supra note 198; Interview with Hayley Buckley, 
Partner, Wynn Williams, in Auckland, N.Z. (May 18, 2017). 
 219. Interview with Colin Magee, supra note 208; Interview with James 
Hartley, supra note 198; Interview with Simeon Burnett, CEO, Snowball Effect, 
in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 27, 2017). 
 220. See supra notes 129–130 and accompanying text (explaining the original 
intention that the JOBs Act would open up potential investment for “anyone who 
can convince the public he has a good business idea”). 
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This is not because New Zealand is opposed to an inclusive 
economy—if anything, the contrary is true.221 
Rather, the focus on efficiency stems from the fact that the 
country has long suffered from a dearth of venture capital and 
angel investment,222 to the point that even highly promising 
startup companies had trouble getting the capital they need to 
survive and grow.223 New Zealand looked to equity crowdfunding 
to serve as an efficient and significant source of early-stage finance 
for promising startup companies.224 It could not afford to 
potentially reduce the efficiency of the system by trying to make it 
inclusive as well. 
Unlike in the United States, where talented entrepreneurs 
can obtain several million dollars from any of a number of 
well-established VC funds and so-called angel investors,225 New 
Zealand has long had a much shallower pool for early-stage capital 
financing.226 Angel investors, for their part, have traditionally been 
almost non-existent: The New Zealand Angel Association was not 
established until 2008,227 and at the time of the FMCA, angels were 
investing just NZ$30 million per year in all New Zealand 
                                                                                                     
 221. See, e.g., Treasury Inclusive Economy Working Group, Towards an 
Inclusive Economy, (New Zealand Treasury, Working Paper 01/15, July 2001), 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2001/01-15 
(“[S]et[ting] out the Treasury’s thinking on how the Government can achieve its 
goal of an inclusive economy.”); cf. FISCHER, supra note 178, at 476 (“New 
Zealanders are more mindful of fairness, justice, and equity [than are 
Americans] . . . .”).  
 222. See supra notes 226–233 and accompanying text (discussing the slow 
growth of angel investors and venture capitalism in New Zealand). 
 223. Interview with Simon Papa, Principal, Cygnus Law, in Auckland, N.Z. 
(Feb. 7, 2017); Interview with Hayley Buckley, supra note 218. 
 224. Interview with Simon Papa, supra note 223; Interview with Hayley 
Buckley, supra note 218. 
 225. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel 
Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1419 n.57 (2008) (“In 2006, angels and venture 
capitalists each invested approximately $25 billion.”). 
 226. See New Zealand Government, Building Capital Markets, 23 (Feb. 2013) 
(“[I]t is often difficult for New Zealand businesses to raise sufficient risk capital 
in our relatively thin markets.”); Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Limit?, supra note 
123 (“[T]here is a hole in the capital markets.”). 
 227. See Our Role, ANGEL ASS’N N.Z., https://www.angelassociation.co.nz/our-
role/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (providing the start date of the organization) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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companies.228 By way of comparison, American angels were 
investing over $9 billion per year at that time.229 
As for venture capital, New Zealand had “no venture capital 
market” at all, as recently as the late 1990s.230 In 2002, the New 
Zealand government attempted to jump-start the domestic VC 
industry by establishing a state-run VC fund-of-funds in 2002, 
called the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF).231 
Despite the addition of the NZVIF, New Zealand VC funds 
continued to “struggl[e] to get the cash they needed to maintain 
the rapid growth of the small, precocious and risky companies in 
their portfolios.”232 “Then the international finance crisis hit,” and 
VC “funding came to a grinding halt.”233 
In 2012, the year that crowdfunding was authorized as part of 
the FMCA, the lack of VC financing remained a major problem.234 
As a NZVIF report from that year explained, “A major issue for 
New Zealand’s capital markets is the lack of sufficient capital to 
meet the needs of young high growth companies. . . . $200 million 
of investment capital is needed each year to meet the existing 
demand, over double what is currently available.”235 Even recently, 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Consolidating Angels Hold Their Own, NZ YOUNG CO. FIN., Issue 14, 
Apr. 2013, at 1, http://www.angelassociation.co.nz/media/2014/04/Young_ 
Company_Finance_Issue_14_April_2013.pdf (providing investment information 
for angel investors in New Zealand). 
 229. Id. at 5. 
 230. N.Z. VENTURE INV. FUND LTD., STATEMENT OF INTENT: 2014–2019, at 2, 
https://www.nzvif.co.nz/assets/publications/Statement-of-Intent-2014.pdf; see 
also JOSH LERNER ET AL., LECG, A STUDY OF NEW ZEALAND’S VENTURE CAPITAL 
MARKET AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY: TO THE MINISTRY OF RESEARCH, 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 4, 63 (2005), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ 
5ed8/580c2f1e003da67f9c400354a51cd8b01fcb.pdf (stating that prior to 2002, 
“there was a virtual absence of dedicated venture capital funds operating in New 
Zealand”). 
 231. N.Z. VENTURE INV. FUND LTD., supra note 230, at 2. 
 232. Mike Booker, The State of Venture Capital in New Zealand, IDEALOG 
(Jan. 30, 2009), https://idealog.co.nz/venture/2009/01/show-us-the-money (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 233. Id.  
 234. See NZVIF, DISCUSSION PAPER: INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN VENTURE 
CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY IN NEW ZEALAND 1 (2012), 
https://www.nzvif.co.nz/assets/publications/Institutional-Inv-Discussion-Paper-
Sept12.pdf (remarking on the continued lack of institutional participation in the 
venture capital and private equity markets).  
 235. Id.  
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New Zealand’s volume of VC investment—scaled as a percentage 
of GDP—is just 8% that of the United States.236 
Thus, a key policy goal of the New Zealand government when 
it passed the FMCA was to address the lack of early-stage 
entrepreneurial finance in the country, and it decided to use equity 
crowdfunding to ameliorate this problem. In its “Business Growth 
Agenda Progress Report” from 2013, the government recognized 
that “it is often difficult for New Zealand businesses to raise 
sufficient risk-capital in our relatively thin markets,”237 and 
pointed to the crowdfunding authorization in the FMCA as a way 
to increase access to startup financing in an efficient manner.238 In 
other statements, the government repeatedly reiterated that its 
policy goal for authorizing equity crowdfunding was to encourage 
efficient and effective capital raising for startups and small 
businesses.239 Notably absent from these discussions was any talk 
                                                                                                     
 236. See OECD ENTREPRENEURSHIP AT A GLANCE 2016, at 137, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/entrepreneur_aag-2016-graph119-en (graphing venture 
capital investments as a percentage of GDP); see also Smylie, Equity 
Crowdfunding Limit?, supra note 123 (“Without a doubt, the capital markets 
infrastructure for companies raising less than $10 million is sparse. Until the 
large brokers kick in for deals of more than $10 million, there just isn’t an efficient 
distribution channel to tap into the capital markets.”). 
 237. New Zealand Government, supra note 227, at 23. 
 238. See id. (“The Government’s updated securities legislation provides 
explicit mechanisms for regulating new forms of intermediated capital raising, 
such as . . . ‘crowd funding’. These enable funds for small businesses . . . to be 
raised in internet-based market places, potentially more efficiently than through 
traditional public or private offerings.”); CABINET BUS. COMM., FINANCIAL 




crowd-funding was highlighted in the Government’s Business Growth Agenda as 
an initiative to support early-stage and growth companies to access the 
risk-capital they need to grow.”); Hayley Buckley, Exploding the Crowdfunding 
Myths, NAT’L BUS. REV., Apr. 12, 2014 (observing that the crowdfunding provision 
in the FMCA responds to the “significant gap in the market for companies looking 
to raise funds”). 
 239. See Press Release, Craig Foss, N.Z. Commerce Minister, Foss Welcomes 
First Crowd-funding License (July 31, 2014) (“New Zealand needs more 
innovative businesses to increase economic growth—[equity crowdfunding] is one 
way for early-stage and growth companies to source the risk capital they need to 
flourish. . . . [Equity crowdfunding is] part of the Government’s Business Growth 
Agenda to build New Zealand’s capital markets and drive business growth, 
exports and jobs . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
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of how crowdfunding could be an inclusive form of startup finance. 
Rather, the focus was entirely on efficiency and addressing the 
insufficient funding from VCs and angel investors. 
Finally, New Zealand’s focus on efficiency rather than 
inclusivity is directly expressed in the FMCA’s statement of 
purpose, found in Sections 3 and 4 of that statute.240 The word and 
concept of inclusivity is nowhere to be found in those Sections; 
rather, the emphasis is on efficient capital raising in order to 
promote economic growth.241 In sum, the policy goal behind New 
Zealand’s authorization of equity crowdfunding in the FMCA was 
efficiency: The government sought to generate a helpful new source 
of venture finance for promising startup companies.242  
                                                                                                     
also Press Release, Craig Foss, N.Z. Commerce Minister, NZ Financial Markets 
Enter New Era, (Apr. 1, 2014) (“Today’s changes [including equity crowdfunding] 
will support confident and informed participation by businesses, investors and 
consumers in New Zealand’s financial markets. It is important that we have clear 
rules for companies wishing to raise capital . . . .”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); CABINET BUS. COMM., FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT 
REGULATIONS PAPER 1: OVERVIEW, at 2, ¶ 11, http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-
services/business/business-law/financial-markets-conduct-act/regulations/ 
financial-market-conduct-regulations-decisions-june-2013/documents-images-
library/Paper%201%20-%20overview.pdf (explaining that the FMCA seeks to 
“promot[e] innovation and new sources of capital . . . by providing 
for . . . crowd-funding platforms”). 
 240. See New Zealand Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, pt 1, s 3 (N.Z.) 
(“The main purposes of this Act are to—(a) promote the confident and informed 
participation of businesses, investors, and consumers in the financial markets; 
and (b) promote and facilitate the development of fair, efficient, and transparent 
financial markets.”); id. s 4. 
This Act has the following additional purposes: (a) to provide for timely, 
accurate, and understandable information to be provided to persons to assist 
those persons to make decisions relating to financial products or the provision of 
financial services: (b) to ensure that appropriate governance arrangements apply 
to financial products and certain financial services that allow for effective 
monitoring and reduce governance risks: (c) to avoid unnecessary compliance 
costs: (d) to promote innovation and flexibility in the financial markets. 
 241. See Thomas Gibbons, Purpose and Principles of Securities Regulation 
11–12, 16 (interpreting the FMCA statement of purpose as “emphasi[zing] capital 
raising and economic growth” because “[s]ound financial markets—productive, 
successful financial markets—have the potential to be of significant benefit to the 
New Zealand economy”), in FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATION: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, supra note 190. 
 242. But cf. FISCHER, supra note 178, at 476 (“Americans think of an open 
society as a free society, centered primarily on the values of liberty and freedom 
that are deeply rooted in American history. New Zealanders are more mindful of 
fairness, justice, and equity, which have long been an important part of their 
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IV. Efficient Versus Inclusive Crowdfunding: A Comparative 
Analysis of New Zealand and the United States 
From the outset, New Zealand sought to establish an efficient 
market for crowdfunding, while the United States tried to create a 
crowdfunding market that was both efficient and inclusive. New 
Zealand deputized crowdfunding platforms to act as gatekeepers 
in order to protect investors from investing in companies that were 
either fraudulent or unlikely to succeed. But the United States, at 
least initially, envisioned a system where platforms would be 
passive entities required by law to allow any and every 
entrepreneur onto their site. Without an active gatekeeper on 
duty, Congress reasonably concluded that it had better demand 
significant mandatory disclosure and other regulations in order to 
protect investors. Of course, the SEC did ultimately empower 
platforms to act as gatekeepers, but that was years later and 
during the regulatory process.243 The unhappy result is that 
although the SEC tried to downgrade inclusivity in an attempt to 
enhance efficiency, the inefficiencies were already baked into the 
statute. 
A. Crowdfunding in New Zealand is More Efficient but Less 
Inclusive 
With its laser-like focus on efficiency, New Zealand has 
created a crowdfunding market that is much more financially 
successful than its counterpart in the United States. This Section 
reports on the results of the New Zealand crowdfunding market, 
and compares those results with both the American crowdfunding 
experience as well as New Zealand venture capital and angel 
investment.244 As will appear, the New Zealand model has turned 
out to be rather efficient, generating a relatively large amount of 
startup capital and avoiding fraud, and is handily outpacing the 
United States in economic terms.245 
                                                                                                     
experience.”). 
 243. Supra Part I.D. 
 244. See infra Sections III.A.1–4 (providing statistical comparisons of the New 
Zealand and U.S. crowdsourcing platforms).  
 245. See John Anthony, New Zealand crowdfunding platforms gearing up for 
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The data in this Section is based on the first year of equity 
crowdfunding in New Zealand, which ran from mid-2014 through 
mid-2015.246 Although New Zealand has been conducting 
crowdfunding for over three years, the focus here is on the first 
year so as to allow a comparison with the United States, which has 
only one year of experience.247 In addition, the second year of New 
Zealand equity crowdfunding had similar results as the first.248 
In the first year of equity crowdfunding in New Zealand, there 
were 27 crowdfunding campaigns in total, 21 of which were 
successful, representing a 78% success rate.249 Those 21 successful 
campaigns raised a cumulative total of NZ$12 million (US$10 
million).250 The average successful raise was NZ$590,000 
(US$470,000), and two campaigns reached the legal limit of NZ$2 
                                                                                                     
big 2016, STUFF, http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/75424341/new-
zealand-crowdfunding-platforms-gearing-up-for-big-2016 (last updated Jan. 24, 
2016) (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (quoting Simeon Burnett, CEO of Snowball 
Effect, describing equity crowdfunding as “really efficient”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 246. See New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 1st Year in Review, CROWDREADY 
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.crowdready.com.au/news-1/2015/8/new-zealand-
equity-crowdfunding-1st-year-in-review (last visited Jan. 2, 2017) [hereinafter 1st 
Year in Review] (reporting on the first year of equity crowdfunding in New 
Zealand, which commenced when the first licenses were issued on July 30, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION CROWDFUNDING: A 
SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR ISSUERS (2016) (noting that American 
crowdfunding commenced on May 16, 2016). 
 248. See Calida Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Numbers Slump After First 
Year, NAT’L BUS. REV. (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/equity-
crowdfunding-numbers-slump-after-first-year-cs-p-196346 [hereinafter Smylie, 
Crowdfunding Numbers Slump] (“New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market 
has just completed its second full year and, on the face of it, the numbers look a 
little flat.”); New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 2nd Year in Review, 
CROWDREADY (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.crowdready.com.au/news-1/2016/10/nz-
equity-crowdfunding-2nd-year-in-review (last visited Jan. 2, 2018) [hereinafter 
2nd Year in Review] (reporting on New Zealand’s second year of crowdfunding) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 249. See 1st Year in Review, supra note 246 (discussing that the results were 
very positive given the historic difficulty in raising capital). 
 250. See id. (noting the amount raised in over twenty-one New Zealand 
companies). The currency conversions in this Section are based on a 0.8 
conversion rate between US and NZ dollars, which was the approximate rate at 
the time in question (2014–2015), and are rounded for the sake of simplicity. 
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million.251 Technology, consumer products and food and beverages 
were the most popular industries.252 
These numbers, while seemingly modest, are significant when 
compared to the traditional forms of startup finance in New 
Zealand, namely VC and angel investors. In 2014, which was the 
year crowdfunding commenced, New Zealand angels invested 
NZ$56 million in 118 deals—a record high.253 New Zealand 
venture capital funds contributed almost precisely the same 
amount that year, NZ$56 million in total, spread across 62 
investments.254 Equity crowdfunding’s total of NZ$12 million over 
21 investments represent a significant contribution of 
entrepreneurial capital for New Zealand startup companies.255 
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market is even more 
impressive when compared to its counterpart in the United States. 
In its first year of operation, from mid-2016 to mid-2017, there 
were 211 crowdfunding campaigns in the United States, 112 of 
which were successful, representing a 53% success rate.256 Those 
112 successful campaigns raised a cumulative total of about $35 
million.257 The average successful raise was about $300,000, and 
nine campaigns reached the legal limit of $1 million.258 Similar to 
                                                                                                     
 251. See id. (stating that six other companies reached their own lower, 
self-imposed maximum targets). 
 252. See id. (“Industry wise, the technology companies represented the most 
number of campaigns with 43% whilst the food/beverage raised the most money 
in New Zealand with $3.8 million despite only 17% of campaigns being companies 
in this industry.”). 
 253. See N.Z. MINISTRY OF BUS. INNOVATION & EMP’T, BUSINESS GROWTH 
AGENDA: BUILDING INVESTMENT 2 (2015) (noting strong activity in early-stage 
capital markets).  
 254. See N.Z. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, NEW ZEALAND 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL MONITOR: 2014 FULL YEAR REVIEW 7 (2014) 
(detailing venture and early stage investment).  
 255. See id. at 8 (charting early stage investments by sector).  
 256. CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS, 
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cca-reg-cf-index/ (focusing on Charts 1 and 3 
as of May 15, 2017, one year after crowdfunding commenced in the United States) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 257. See CCLEAR Dashboard, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS (July 28, 2016), 
http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cclear_public (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) 
(reporting a total of about $35 million) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 258. See id. (noting the average campaign success). 
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New Zealand, technology and food and beverages were among the 
most popular industries.259 
When comparing New Zealand and American crowdfunding, 
one must account for the fact that the American economy is about 
100 times as large as that of New Zealand.260 If we scale the New 
Zealand crowdfunding numbers up by a factor of 100, then the 
number of campaigns would have been 2,700 (2,100 of which were 
successful), and the successful campaigns would have raised a 
total of US$1 billion.261 Recall that the United States had only 211 
campaigns (112 successful ones), raising a total of $35 million.262 
In other words, scaled for the size of its economy, New Zealand had 
about thirteen times as many campaigns as the United States; New 
Zealand companies had a success rate of nearly 80%, compared to 
the American rate of about 50%; and New Zealand issuers raised 
about thirty times as much money as did their American 
counterparts.263 These numbers are remarkable. 
Furthermore, in the brief history of New Zealand 
crowdfunding, not a single funded company was revealed to be a 
fraud, and there has been just one liquidation.264 Now, this time 
period is relatively brief, and the overall New Zealand economy has 
been strong over those three years, so these aspects of the results 
must be taken with a grain of salt. Fraud and poor business 
performance could be occurring at crowdfunded companies and we 
                                                                                                     
 259. See 1st Year in Review, supra note 246 (outlining New Zealand’s most 
successful crowdfunding industries). 
 260. See WORLD BANK, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT RANKING 1 (2016) (reporting 
that the United States has the largest GDP while New Zealand has the fifty-first 
largest GDP). In U.S. dollars, the GDP of the United States is about $18 trillion 
and the GDP of New Zealand is about $184 billion. 
 261. See id. (noting the significant difference between the size of the two 
economies). 
 262. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing the first year U.S. 
crowdfunding campaigns).  
 263. See supra notes 248–262 (outlining New Zealand’s crowdfunding 
statistics).  
 264. See Interview with Colin Magee, supra note 209; Paul McBeth, Balex 
Marine, Snowball Crowdfunder Participant, Sunk by High Costs, Slow Sales, 
NAT’L BUS. REV. (May 17, 2017), https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/balex-marine-
snowball-crowdfunder-participant-sunk-high-costs-slow-sales-b-203033 (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2018) (reporting on the first crowdfunding company to liquidate) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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would not necessarily know about it.265 It also bears noting that 
dividends are practically nonexistent among New Zealand 
crowdfunded companies, and that we have yet to see any IPOs or 
other sort of remunerative “exit” for the investors.266 
At the same time, zero instances of fraud after three years is 
a record that New Zealand should be proud of. In other countries 
with active equity crowdfunding markets, fraud has revealed itself 
fairly promptly,267 but this has not happened in New Zealand. 
Thus, it remains impressive for New Zealand crowdfunding to 
have generated a perfect record regarding fraud, and a 
near-perfect record regarding business failures, to date. 
In sum, New Zealand set out to create a highly efficient system 
of equity crowdfunding that would funnel capital to promising 
startups that need it.268 It was not distracted by any other policy 
goals, most notably inclusivity.269 And the data presented in this 
Section show that New Zealand has largely succeeded in achieving 
its singular goal of creating an efficient market for equity 
crowdfunding.270 
How did New Zealand generate such an efficient equity 
crowdfunding market? First, New Zealand’s law and regulations 
are liberal and simple, thus imposing much lower compliance costs 
than the JOBS Act and related regulations.271 Second, and more 
                                                                                                     
 265. See Nathaniel Popper, Doubts Arise as Investors Flock to Crowdfunded 
Start-Ups, N.Y TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/ 
business/dealbook/crowdfunding-fraud-investing-startups.html (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2018) (noting that fraud found in crowdfunding may be easily overlooked 
by investors) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 266. See Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, CROWDSPHERE, 
https://crowdsphere.co.nz/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) (detailing risks of 
investment including illiquidity, lack of dividends, loss of investment and 
dilution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law  Review). 
 267. See, e.g., James T. Areddy, Chinese Pile On Risk, One Swipe at a Time, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2017, at A1 (describing investigations into fraud and sharp 
dealing in the China crowdfunding industry). 
 268. See supra Part II.A (comparing New Zealand’s crowdsourcing strategy to 
United States crowdfunding).  
 269. See supra Part II.C (outlining New Zealand’s policy goal of efficiency over 
inclusivity).  
 270. See infra Part III.A.1–4 (providing statistics on the efficiency of New 
Zealand’s system).  
 271. See supra Part I.B (discussing compliance costs under the U.S. 
crowdfunding policies).  
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importantly for present purposes, New Zealand’s crowdfunding 
system depends on private actors to organize the market, keep it 
honest, and make it work well, all without direct participation on 
the part of the government.272 As expected, market participants 
have indeed established numerous effective modes of private 
ordering or private governance, including “gatekeepers,” 
“syndication,” “pre-existing crowds,” and “reputation.”273 As will be 
seen, these techniques have the side effect of diminishing 
entrepreneurial inclusivity, which is not a problem in New 
Zealand, but it may be in the United States. 
1. Gatekeepers 
New Zealand’s law envisions that the licensed crowdfunding 
platforms would act as strict “gatekeepers” and only allow 
legitimate and promising companies to access the crowd. The 
model is one of market-based incentives, rather than regulatory 
commands.274 Platforms have a self-interest in establishing and 
maintaining an online reputation as a reliable place for investors 
to put their money.275 If they allow fraudulent or low-quality 
companies onto their site, and investors lose their money, the 
investors will not come back and the platform will go out of 
business.276 Knowing all this, platforms can be expected to only 
invite legitimate and sound companies to participate on their 
                                                                                                     
 272. See generally Schwartz, Crowdfunding in New Zealand, supra note 18. 
 273. See infra Part III.A.1–4 (outlining critical elements of New Zealand’s 
crowdfunding program).  
 274. See Mackenzie McCarty, Cabinet Gives Green Light to Equity 
Crowdfunding, N.Z. LAW (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz/ 
news/cabinet-gives-green-light-to-equity-crowdfunding-184672.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2018) (noting that the system incentivizes crowdfunding platforms to 
have reputable companies to avoid failures) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 275. See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219 (describing 
reputation as a driver). 
 276. See McCarty, supra note 274 (quoting Hayley Buckley as saying, 
“[i]t’s . . . really going to be quite self-fulfilling, because the platform will be 
incentivised to have the best companies—they really don’t want any failures on 
their platforms. And that’s aligning them absolutely with the interests of 
investors”).   
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site.277 The platform’s gatekeeping role thus protects investors and 
gives them the confidence to participate in the market.278 
This gatekeeper model may well be an efficient system, and 
the results discussed above suggest it is, but it is plainly not 
inclusive. The effect is that entrepreneurs are not allowed to go 
directly to the crowd and solicit funds; rather, they do have to 
impress the platform’s management to get their chance to 
crowdfund.279 This is the polar opposite of the inclusive vision 
found in reward crowdfunding and the original version of SEC 
Rule 402(b)(1), where entrepreneurs would go straight to the crowd 
and it would decide whom to support.280 
In practice, New Zealand platforms take their gatekeeper role 
seriously and are very selective in deciding which companies to 
allow to list on their site.281 They understand perfectly well how 
vital it is to protect their reputation and accordingly exclude 
companies that are unlikely to succeed, or that have any chance of 
being fraudulent. Snowball Effect, for instance, lists only 2% of the 
hundreds of companies that want to crowdfund on their site, 
“mostly because they’re not investment ready.”282 The platform is 
selective because, according to the company, “we’ve got our own 
reputation [to protect and because] we want investors to get what 
                                                                                                     
 277. See id. (discussing the strict licensing process). 
 278. See id. (“It’s [also] really going to be quite self-fulfilling, because the 
platform will be incentivised to have the best companies—they really don’t want 
any failures on their platforms. And that’s aligning them absolutely with the 
interests of investors.” (quoting Hayley Buckley)); Interview with Hayley 
Buckley, supra note 218. 
 279. See Josh Daniell, Do We Still Call it Equity Crowdfunding?, SNOWBALL 
EFFECT (Oct. 6, 2016), https://nzbusiness.co.nz/article/do-we-still-call-it-equity-
crowdfunding (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (discussing the process for connecting 
investors and companies) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 280. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text (detailing that funding 
portals were originally almost completely passive entities and could not 
subjectively screen crowdfunding offers). 
 281. See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219 (discussing the 
rigorous listing requirements). 
 282. See Smylie, Crowdfunding Regulations too Light-Handed?, supra note 
207 (“98% of companies we point in another direction.”) (quoting Snowball Effect 
co-founder, Josh Daniell); Anthony, supra note 245 (“Snowball Effect had been 
approached by hundreds of companies wanting to crowdfund but it was selective 
about which were chosen for the platform.”). 
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we think are interesting opportunities that are ready for public 
investment.”283 
This focus on selectivity, rather than inclusivity, is not unique 
to Snowball Effect, but is rather standard practice in the 
industry.284 A founder of another equity crowdfunding platform 
was quoted as saying, “I think everyone’s being really selective 
about what offers they’re putting in the market to make sure there 
is a higher probability of success.”285 This line of thinking has been 
criticized by some, including the founder of yet another platform, 
who wished that New Zealand would have embraced a more 
inclusive model: “The only way to maintain a high success rate is 
for the platform to cherry-pick offers they think will succeed. If 
that’s the case, then really you are just mirroring the current 
finance models—entrepreneurs end up convincing an individual 
gatekeeper, not testing their idea on the crowd.”286  
A seeming exception to the general practice is found in 
PledgeMe, an equity crowdfunding platform that tries to be 
inclusive and “welcomes all businesses to use its platform”: “We 
don’t tell people that they can’t crowdfund but we definitely give 
them feedback on areas they might want to look at before they go 
live.”287 However, even PledgeMe screens companies that ask to 
list on the site by putting each one through a multi-week 
one-on-one course called “Crowdfunding U[niversity]” before 
allowing them to use the site.288 Given that nearly half of the 
                                                                                                     
 283. See Anthony, supra note 245 (“We need to make sure that companies are 
suitable for our offering and a lot of companies aren’t.” (quoting Snowball Effect 
co-founder Josh Daniell)). 
 284. See Nathan Rose & Josh Daniell, Angel Investors Join the Crowd, 
ASSEMBLE ADVISORY (“Each equity crowdfunding marketplace [in New Zealand] 
is ‘curated’ or ‘vetted’ to some extent.”). 
 285. See Brendan Manning, Riding the New Wave of Equity Raising, N.Z. 
HERALD, July 23, 2015 (quoting David Wallace, founder of the Crowdcube equity 
crowdfunding platform). 
 286. See Calida Smylie, Younger Crowdfunding Platforms Fail to Gain 
Traction, NAT’L BUS. REV. (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/younger-
crowdfunding-platforms-fail-gain-traction-cs-p-179663 (quoting Adam Hunt, 
founder of the Liftoff equity crowdfunding platform); Interview with Adam Hunt, 
Founder, Liftoff, in Auckland, N.Z. (Apr. 7, 2017). 
 287. Anthony, supra note 245; see generally also Interview of Anna Guenther, 
CEO, PledgeMe, in Wellington, N.Z. (June 19, 2017); Interview of Barry Grehan, 
Chief Lending Officer, PledgeMe, in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 24, 2017). 
 288. See Crowdfunding University, PLEDGEME, http://guide.pledgeme.co.nz/ 
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companies drop out before completing the course,289 this acts as an 
effective way to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
In sum, rather than allowing every entrepreneur to “have a 
go,” the platforms act as strict gatekeepers that only allow a select 
few to access the crowd.290 This is efficient, but not inclusive, from 
the perspective of an entrepreneur. 
2. Syndication 
Syndication is where the crowd invests alongside a large and 
sophisticated “lead” investor, and is a method borrowed directly 
from angel investors.291 Under this model, one “active” or “lead” 
angel, presumably an expert in the relevant industry, researches 
a company and the proposed terms of investment, and then reports 
back to the rest of the angels in the group.292 The other angels in 
the group play a “passive” role; they trust in the expertise and 
diligence of the lead angel.293 
The distinctive legal regime in New Zealand has allowed for 
syndication to develop as a key method for privately regulating its 
equity crowdfunding market. Unlike the United States (as well as 
practically every other country), New Zealand’s crowdfunding law 
imposes no cap on the amount an investor may contribute.294 This 
was a conscious decision on the part of the government and 
specifically designed, at least in part, to facilitate large 
                                                                                                     
crowdfundingu (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (detailing the site’s training program 
for new companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 289. Interview with Barry Grehan, supra note 287. 
 290. See supra notes 282–289 and accompanying text (noting that the 
selectivity is a defining feature of the system).  
 291. See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future is 
Here, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 542 (2015) (“The syndicates shadow trade, as 
coinvestors, on the trades of ‘lead angels’ or ‘angel advisers.’”).  
 292. See id. at 542–43 (“[T]he angel takes the lead in identifying the 
investment opportunity and negotiating the terms on behalf of their syndicate.”). 
 293. See id. at 543 (noting that passive investors are able to observe and follow 
in the angels’ lead). 
 294. See supra note 217  and accompanying text (stating that the U.S. puts a 
cap on the investment to prevent investors from risking more than they can 
afford).  
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investments by lead investors and syndication by the rest of the 
crowd—just like in traditional angel investing.295 
Hence under New Zealand law an angel investor is legally 
permitted to invest hundreds of thousands through a 
crowdfunding campaign, making it cost-effective to undertake the 
burden of acting as a lead investor.296 The lead investor often 
makes a very sizable investment herself, sometimes as much as 
$500,000 at a time.297 Such an amount would be unlawful under 
American law, but it is perfectly legal in New Zealand. In practice, 
lead investors have become a very important component of the 
equity crowdfunding marketplace.298 Like in an angel group, the 
lead investor conducts research on the company and the rest of the 
crowd comes along for the ride. Professional investors, including 
angels and VCs, sometimes play the role of cornerstone investor.299 
They serve to lend credibility to an offer; others take the fact that 
someone has bought a large block of shares as a signal that the 
company is sound and the valuation is fair.300 Commonly, a lead 
investor will arrange in advance to contribute a large sum to a 
crowdfunding campaign, thus providing it with momentum from 
the first day. 
The experience in New Zealand shows that lead or cornerstone 
investors have become an important component of the 
crowdfunding marketplace.301 As the market has matured, and the 
                                                                                                     
 295. See Interview with James Hartley, supra note 198 (noting the 
similarities to angel investing). 
 296. See Oesterle, supra note 291, at 543 (“The lead angels’ or angel advisers’ 
economic incentive to participate is a form of carried interest, a slice of the profits 
of the syndicate returns.”). 
 297. Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Smylie, Crowdfunding Numbers Slump, supra note 248 (describing 
“at least four campaigns [as] being partially led by a professional investor”); 
Manning, supra note 285 (“We’re seeing some angels and VCs integrating equity 
crowdfunding as a step in their investment strategy.”). 
 300. See Shaun Edlin, Pre-arranged Capital and Momentum: Is Real Money 
Being Raised Through Online Marketplaces?, SNOWBALL EFFECT (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/lessons-weve-learnt-about-momentum 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that a lead investor helps validate the offer 
price) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Interview 
with Simeon Burnett, supra note 219. 
 301. See Edlin, supra note 300  
We encourage companies raising through Snowball to seek a credible 
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importance of cornerstone investors has become clearer, the 
average number of investors in successful campaigns dropped from 
152 in the first year to 82 in the second year, and the average 
investment amount increased 65%.302 A knowledgeable observer 
explained this change as a direct consequence of the participation 
of cornerstone investors contributing NZ$100,000 to NZ$400,000 
to a single campaign.303 
In the United States, syndication is not a viable model for 
crowdfunding due to the structure of the securities crowdfunding 
law in place there. The JOBS Act places a low legal limit on the 
total amount that a person may invest in all crowdfunding 
companies each year.304 The upshot is that most Americans are 
limited to about $3,000–$5,000 per year or less—and this amount 
is not per investment, but rather per year—making it economically 
infeasible for any one person to take on the role of lead investor.305 
The investor cap is simply too low to make it worthwhile for a lead 
angel to spend the time and effort it takes to find an appropriate 
investment and conduct adequate due diligence. 
On the whole, cornerstone investors are an important 
component of the New Zealand equity crowdfunding market. Their 
presence is a significant factor in whether an offer will succeed in 
                                                                                                     
investor to lead their offer. . . . To date, only three offers through our 
marketplace have failed to reach their minimum investment target. 
[T]he one thing all three offers had in common was that they lacked a 
credible lead investor for the round. 
See also Interview with Hayley Buckley, supra note 218. 
 302. See Smylie, Crowdfunding Numbers Slump, supra note 248 (noting that 
the average investment amount increased 65%). 
 303. See id. (emphasizing the impact of the presence of a professional 
investor).  
 304. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (stating that the average limit 
does not exceed $5,000). 
 305. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (placing limits on amounts sold to investors 
per year). The JOBS Act defines the annual investor cap as 5% of the lesser of 
one’s annual income or net worth (10% for people with an annual income and net 
worth over $100,000, up to an absolute cap of $100,000). Id. Thus, even a wealthy 
person of the sort who might act as an angel investor would be legally barred from 
making large investments via crowdfunding. Someone with an annual income of 
$400,000 and a net worth of $25 million may only legally invest $40,000 per year 
(10% of the lesser) in all crowdfunding companies.  Even someone with an annual 
income of $5 million and a net worth of $1 billion may only invest $100,000 (the 
cap) each year.  The effect is that wealthy investors effectively cannot participate 
in crowdfunding in the manner that they would in a traditional angel group. 
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reaching its financing goal, both because they contribute a large 
sum and because they encourage other investors to participate.306 
In this way, they have greatly enhanced the New Zealand equity 
crowdfunding market’s efficiency and ability of companies to get 
funded. 
The importance of finding a cornerstone investor, however, 
makes New Zealand crowdfunding more exclusive than it would 
otherwise be. All else being equal, platforms are more likely to list 
a company if it already has a cornerstone investor lined up and 
ready to contribute, and less likely if the company lacks such an 
investor.307 New Zealand’s market has thus evolved in a manner 
that makes it more difficult for those who have trouble finding 
traditional investors to get their chance to impress the crowd. In 
other words, while syndication does seem to enhance efficiency, it 
does so at the cost of inclusivity. 
3. Pre-Existing Crowds 
The crowdfunding law enacted in the United States expressly 
prohibits a company from directly advertising their crowdfund 
offering to potential investors.308 The apparent rationale for the 
bar on advertising was that Congress wanted people to make their 
investing decisions based on the full disclosures mandated under 
the law, and feared that advertisements might not include all of 
the required information.309 Thus the law does allow issuers to 
direct investors to the online funding platform, where they would 
find the full set of mandated disclosures.310 The SEC’s regulations 
implemented this portion of the JOBS Act by providing that 
issuers may publish simple, textual “tombstone ads” that include 
                                                                                                     
 306. See supra notes 282–59 (outlining the benefits of having lead investors).  
 307. See supra notes 301–306 and accompanying text (discussing how New 
Zealand platforms are more selective when choosing companies to offer to 
investors).  
 308. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) (“[A]n issuer who offers or sells securities [via 
crowdfunding] shall . . . not advertise the terms of the offering, except for notices 
which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.”). 
 309. See Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, supra note 15, at 1464 (listing 
the information that issuers are required to provide).  
 310. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) (prohibiting any advertising other than 
notices directing investors to the funding portal). 
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only the terms of the offering and “direct an investor to the 
intermediary’s platform through which the offering is being 
conducted, such as through a link.”311 
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding law, in contrast, has no 
prohibition or limitation on advertising.312 Rather, the law allows 
an issuer to advertise, promote and market its offering as it sees 
fit.313 This is an important feature of the FMCA, since it enables 
crowdfunding companies to “activate” their pre-existing crowd of 
supporters, such as customers or previous investors, to participate 
in the offering. This is an effective way to jumpstart a 
crowdfunding campaign and generate momentum off the bat, 
which as discussed above is vital to successfully reaching the 
all-or-nothing target.314 In other words—and this is hardly 
surprising—by advertising its offering to its supporters, a 
crowdfunding issuer increases its likelihood of success. 
But all of this depends on a company actually having a 
pre-existing crowd of supporters ready to invest. What about a 
brand-new startup company with no product, no customers and no 
ready-made crowd? Those sorts of issuers are much less likely to 
generate the early momentum needed to reach the all-or-nothing 
target.315 And because they are unlikely to succeed, the gatekeeper 
platforms are unlikely to want them on their site. Thus the effect 
of the FMCA’s permission to advertise is to help established 
companies succeed in their crowdfunding campaigns, and to 
marginalize those that lack a pre-existing group of supporters.316 
By allowing flashy and exciting advertising and other forms of 
marketing, the New Zealand system enhances efficiency by 
increasing the success rate of crowdfunding campaigns.317 At the 
                                                                                                     
 311. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.204 (2016) (regulating advertising that offerors may 
issue). 
 312. See supra Part II.B (emphasizing that the FMCA is simpler than the 
JOBS Act). 
 313. See Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 st 89–94 (N.Z.) (providing 
advertising regulations for offers).  
 314. See supra notes 317–92 (noting strategies to initiate campaign 
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companies great autonomy in conducting offers and advertising).  
 317. See James Murray, Equity Crowdfunding and Peer-to-Peer Lending in 
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same time, it also has the effect of excluding entrepreneurs who 
are out-of-the-loop and who lack connections—the precise group 
that crowdfunding was originally intended to include.318 
Consistent with the FMCA’s authorization of advertising, New 
Zealand equity crowdfunding platforms prefer to list companies 
that already have a strong network or following, such as customers 
or prior investors.319 This enhances efficiency, but is not inclusive 
in the sense originally advanced in reward crowdfunding and in 
the SEC’s preliminary version of Rule 402(b)(1).320 To the contrary, 
it excludes those sorts of entrepreneurs who lack connections and 
access, those who have not yet tasted success—precisely the group 
that was crowdfunding originally intended to help. 
Experience in New Zealand and elsewhere shows that 
momentum is key to a successful crowdfunding campaign.321 Thus 
to generate that momentum, market participants all agree that it 
is vital for a campaign to have a pre-arranged set of investors 
“ready to pledge in the first few hours the campaign is live.”322 In 
the colorful words of one commenter, “Launching an online equity 
offer is like making a movie: everything depends on 
pre-production. If your offer doesn’t explode as soon as it goes live, 
it’s probably going to limp to the finish line, or die trying. This 
means you need to build the buzz before your offer is even live.”323 
Thus at Snowball Effect, for instance, “an average of 15.8% of all 
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(detailing numerous campaigns experiencing high success rates).  
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investment . . . has been pre-arranged before each offer has gone 
live.”324 
The only way to generate this sort of ready-to-go interest 
(apart from cornerstone investors) is if the issuer already has a 
pre-existing crowd of supporters that are willing to invest and 
spread the word.325 The platforms count on the issuers to “activate” 
their crowd.326 For example, Invivo Wines, the first company to hit 
the NZ$2 million crowdfunding limit, had pledges of over NZ 
$770,000 already in place at the start of the crowdfunding 
campaign.327 The model relied heavily on the company as opposed 
to the platform to raise funds.328 “If you look 
at . . . Invivo . . . they’re going to the market with 20,000 plus 
followers on Facebook and they’re who they’re activating for the 
funding. . . . Those sorts of networks are really important for the 
process to work.”329 Another similar example can be found in 
Yeastie Boys, a craft brewer, which raised NZ$500,000 “in half an 
hour following an active social media campaign and investor 
information sessions to promote the offer.”330 More generally, an 
executive at PledgeMe estimates that about 75% of investors in a 
given offering have some sort of pre-existing connection to the 
company.331 
The effect of the need for a pre-existing network is that a 
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 325. See Promoting 101, supra note 322 (providing guidance for advertising 
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company without one is unlikely to reach its financial target and 
thus unlikely to be accepted onto a platform in the first place. 
Unless you have “an established business,” “customers,” and “a 
large network of people who are ready and waiting to spread your 
message,” you are probably going to be screened out by the 
gatekeeper platforms.332 This is great for efficiency, as it is most 
efficient to list only companies that are likely to succeed, but it 
fosters an exclusive, not an inclusive, crowdfunding market.333 
4. Reputation 
Individual entrepreneurs have their own reputations to 
consider when they launch a crowdfunding campaign. Because 
New Zealand is a small country (about the size and population of 
a single state), personal connections are never too tenuous—and 
the Internet never forgets. If an entrepreneur were to be caught 
deceiving the public in her crowdfund listing, her reputation would 
be forever marred, with evidence of the wrongdoing etched in 
permanent digital form on Facebook and elsewhere. A similar fate 
would befall someone who squandered the money she collected 
through crowdfunding, whether through shirking or malfeasance. 
Knowing all this, crowdfunding entrepreneurs in New Zealand 
can be expected to behave themselves both during their campaign 
and once they have received the money. This seems to happen in 
practice, as there has never been a single funded company that 
turned out to be a fraud, and only one company has gone out of 
business, since New Zealand began crowdfunding in 2014.334 
At the same time, the importance of reputation is contrary to 
a desire for inclusivity. In the United States, at least, 
crowdfunding was envisioned as a way for unknown 
entrepreneurs, meaning those without a reputation in the funding 
community, to pitch their idea directly to the public.335 But the 
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crowdfunding offers). 
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New Zealand system benefits entrepreneurs with strong 
reputations and punishes those with weak reputations, which is 
contrary to the inclusive ideal. 
B. Crowdfunding in the United States is Less Efficient but More 
Inclusive 
Crowdfunding in the United States is less efficient and much 
smaller than in New Zealand, as detailed in the last Section.336 One 
probable cause of this relative paucity of interest on the part of 
entrepreneurs is the high cost of conducting a crowdfunding 
offering in the United States.337 When an issuer is limited to 
raising only $1 million, it is vital to keep costs very low. In New 
Zealand, the law and regulations are liberal and simple, thus 
imposing much lower compliance costs than the JOBS Act and 
related regulations.338 In the United States, compliance costs are 
so high that they prevent many issuers from conducting a 
crowdfund offering that makes economic sense.339 If it costs 
$40,000 to raise $100,000 through crowdfunding, many companies 
                                                                                                     
few, if any, obstacles for entrepreneurs). 
 336. See supra Part III.A (providing an overview of the differences in 
efficiency between crowdfunding in New Zealand and the U.S.). 
 337. See Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory 
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 284–85 (2014) 
[The regulatory burden of complying with Title III of the JOBS Act] 
will translate into higher legal and accounting fees, higher premiums 
on directors and officers liability insurance (“D&O insurance”), and 
higher intermediation fees. For a capital raise of $1 million (which is 
the maximum in retail crowdfunding), the SEC roughly estimates a 
cost of up to $152,260, which may be an underestimation. This could 
be prohibitively expensive for many small issuers. 
See also Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 83, at 1605 (commenting on the 
“costly set of responsibilities” imposed by Title III of the JOBS Act). 
 338. See Henry William Hillind, Exploiting the Crowd: The New Zealand 
Response to Equity Crowd Funding, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 46, 52 (2015) (noting New 
Zealand’s decision to not impose an investor cap as compared to other countries). 
 339. See Brian Korn, SEC Proposes Crowdfunding Rules, FORBES (Oct. 23, 
2013, 2:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/10/23/sec-
proposes-crowdfunding-rules/#637b9f77f6bd (last visited Jan. 24, 2018) (“The 
high expenses compared to the low maximum amounts that can be raised by a 
company and invested by an individual make public equity crowdfunding one of 
the costliest forms of (legal) capital raising.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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will not participate, even if they have good use for $100,000 and 
cannot obtain the money elsewhere. 
Because New Zealand was focused entirely on efficiency, it 
comes as no surprise that New Zealand’s crowdfunding market is 
much more successful in economic terms than the one in the 
United States.340 But what about inclusivity? The American 
system was supposed to achieve that policy goal as well,341 while 
New Zealand had no intention of doing so.342 The SEC’s final 
version of its crowdfunding regulations, although they allow 
platforms to act as gatekeepers,343 still retain other legal rules 
designed to create an inclusive market. The final regulations 
sharply limit advertising344 and maintain the per-investor cap that 
prevents cornerstone investors from playing a role.345 The 
remainder of this Section examines the empirical evidence from 
the first year of American crowdfunding to determine whether it 
has met its policy goal of inclusivity for entrepreneurs.346 As will 
be discussed, the evidence on this score is somewhat mixed. 
                                                                                                     
 340. See Lloyd Kavanagh, New Zealand: The Equity Crowdfunding 
Revolution, MINTERELLISONRUDDWATTS (Oct. 11, 2017), https://minterellison.co. 
nz/our-view/new-zealand-the-equity-crowdfunding-revolution (last visited Jan. 
24, 2018) (providing data on the first three years of crowdfunding in New Zealand 
compared to the first year in the United States and citing an earlier draft of the 
present article) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 341. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the use of securities crowdfunding as a 
means of promoting inclusive entrepreneurship). 
 342. See supra Part III.C (identifying efficiency as the singular goal of New 
Zealand’s crowdfunding law). 
 343. See supra Part III.D (discussing the ways in which the SEC attempted 
to balance the goals of inclusivity and efficiency in the finalized regulations). 
 344. See Max E. Isaacson, The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets: 
Why Title III of the JOBS Act Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Crowdfunding, 20 
N.C. BANKING INST. 439, 459–61 (2016) (discussing the key advertising limitations 
of the JOBS Act). 
 345. See id. at 454–55 (discussing the potential negative impacts of the 
funding cap).  
 346. Some of the data in this Part is based on statistics from the first 7.5 
months of crowdfunding in the United States, namely from May 16, 2016, through 
the end of that calendar year. See VLADIMIR IVANOV & ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, U.S. 
SECURITIES-BASED CROWDFUNDING UNDER TITLE III OF THE JOBS ACT 1 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/RegCF_WhitePaper.pdf 
(setting forth evidence on initial crowdfunding activity in the period immediately 
after the new regulations became effective); Sherwood Neiss, Here’s How 
Regulation Crowdfunding Performed in 2016, VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 11, 2017, 5:05 
PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/01/11/heres-how-regulation-crowdfunding-
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Like in New Zealand, crowdfunding platforms in the United 
States may screen, curate and otherwise exclude companies based 
on the platform’s subjective view of the merits of the investment.347 
To get listed on a crowdfunding site in the United States, 
entrepreneurs must first prove their worth to the gatekeeper (the 
platform) who has a financial incentive to only open the gate for 
the most promising companies.348 Even so, American crowdfunding 
has become a fairly inclusive market from the standpoint of 
entrepreneurs. Despite the ability of American crowdfunding 
platforms to act as gatekeepers, there is substantial evidence to 
indicate that platforms are relatively liberal in deciding whom to 
present to the crowd. 
In particular, very young startup companies without a track 
record, without a crowd of pre-existing investors or customers, and 
even without any assets, are in fact given a chance to pitch to the 
crowd.349 The typical crowdfunding company in the United States 
is so young as to be brand new. About 40% are less than one year 
old,350 and 20% are less than three months old. The median age of 
a crowdfunding company in the United States is just eighteen 
months, and the average age is two years.351 In New Zealand, by 
contrast, the average crowdfunding issuer is eight years old.352 
Consistent with the goal of inclusivity, American crowdfunding 
platforms are much more welcoming to brand-new, untested 
startups, whereas New Zealand gatekeepers are more likely to list 
established companies. 
                                                                                                     
performed-in-2016/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing data concerning the 
immediate impact of the JOBS Act crowdfunding regulations) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review) . 
 347. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1496–99 (discussing the importance of 
allowing crowdfunding platforms to regulate fundraising activities).  
 348. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1) (2017) (granting discretion to funding 
portals to determine which issuers to include on their platforms). 
 349. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 13 (“[T]he typical 
[crowdfunding] issuer is a small, young startup.”). 
 350. CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, supra note 256 (focusing on 
Chart 11, which provides the total amount of committed capital to all campaigns 
raising funds under Regulation Crowdfunding since May 16, 2016). 
 351. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 13–14 (noting that these ages 
are based “on the initial filing relative to the date of incorporation”). 
 352. Id. 
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In the same vein, the median crowdfunding company in the 
United States had just three employees and $43,000 in assets, and 
one-quarter of issuers had no assets at all.353 The majority (60%) 
of American companies had no revenue, and almost all (91%) were 
not profitable, when they undertook a crowdfunding campaign.354 
Most successful crowdfunding campaigns in the United States 
raised less than $200,000, with dozens raising under $100,000.355 
The median amount raised was about $170,000.356 These numbers 
indicate that American crowdfunding has attracted tiny startups 
of the sort that are not generally listed on New Zealand 
crowdfunding platforms, but which are given their chance in the 
inclusive American system. 
In addition, only about 10% of American crowdfunding 
companies have previous investors, such as VCs or angel 
investors.357 For the other 90% of issuers, “crowdfunding [is] their 
initial foray into capital raising through a securities offering.”358 
Recall that in New Zealand, platforms tend to prefer companies 
that already have a pre-existing investor base.359 This is another 
indicator that crowdfunding in the United States is achieving its 
goal of including all entrepreneurs, even those “out of the loop.” 
One final indicator of the inclusive nature of American 
crowdfunding is the fact that crowdfunding campaigns in the 
United States have a much lower success rate than in New 
Zealand. Recall that New Zealand platforms generally try to only 
                                                                                                     
 353. See id. (noting that the average issuer had five employees and held 
approximately $327,000 in assets). 
 354. See id. at 14 (“The median offering involved an issuer with 3 employees 
and approximately $43,000 in assets . . . .”). 
 355. See 183 Reg CF Companies Have Hit Their Funding Target, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/stats/all (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (providing data on 
company funding targets as of May 16, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); see also IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 19 (describing 
the characteristics of issuers that reported success and those that did not report 
success). 
 356. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 1 (“[T]he median (average) 
amount raised was approximately $171,000 ($303,000).”). 
 357. Id. at 15. 
 358. See id. at 15 (highlighting evidence that “some issuers had previously or 
subsequently conducted an offering under Regulation D or Regulation A”). 
 359. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing the ways in which New Zealand’s 
crowdfunding laws promote efficiency by favoring established companies, while 
marginalizing those without a pre-existing base of supporters). 
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list companies that they expect to succeed in reaching their 
financial target, leading to a success rate of about 80%.360 
American crowdfunding campaigns, by contrast, succeed about 
50% of the time.361 This statistical disparity was previously used 
to show that New Zealand has a more efficient crowdfunding 
market than does the United States (which it does).362 But it also 
shows that American crowdfunding platforms are relatively liberal 
and inclusive when deciding which companies to list on their sites. 
Based on all of these statistics, the SEC has concluded that 
American crowdfunding is fulfilling its inclusive goal of “providing 
a new source of capital for entrepreneurial and small businesses 
that may not otherwise have had access to capital.”363 Even so, 
other evidence from the first year of American crowdfunding 
indicate that the system may not be quite as inclusive as was 
originally hoped.364 
In terms of geography, there are certain, well-known hubs of 
venture capital and angel investment, led by Silicon Valley in 
California, as well as New York City, Boston, and Austin, Texas.365 
The traditional way for an entrepreneur to access those pools of 
capital was to physically travel or relocate to one of those places.366 
                                                                                                     
 360. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the gatekeeping role that New Zealand 
crowdfunding platforms play in excluding companies that are unlikely to 
succeed). 
 361. See supra notes 246–259 and accompanying text (discussing the 
differences in the first-year success rates of equity crowdfunding between New 
Zealand and the United States). 
 362. See supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining the methods used by New Zealand 
crowdfunding platforms in their gatekeeping role to promote selectivity and 
efficiency). 
 363. IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 16. 
 364. See supra notes 121–131 and accompanying text (discussing the policy 
rationales behind the United States’ goal of inclusivity in crowdfunding 
regulations). 
 365. See Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, supra note 123, at 286 (noting that 
most venture capital firms tend to be concentrated in metropolitan locales, and 
angel investors are generally found in “urban oases among rural regions). 
 366. See id. at 284 
The upshot is that an entrepreneur with big dreams is still given the 
same advice today that Horace Greely is said to have offered in the late 
1800s: “Go west, young man, go west!” The conventional thinking is 
that the ambitious among us must physically relocate from one part of 
the country to another in order to find early-stage business financing. 
Even for rural entrepreneurs that would prefer to remain in, say, Iowa, 
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American crowdfunding under the JOBS Act was a way “to bring 
venture capital to rural areas. By allowing rural entrepreneurs to 
connect with and obtain financing from angel investors on the 
Internet, crowdfunding frees them from the geographic constraint 
that has long hindered entrepreneurship in rural areas.”367 
In practice, as crowdfunding has developed, this 
transcendence of geography occurred, but only to a modest extent. 
As might have been expected, the geographic distribution of 
crowdfunding issuers is dominated by California, with about 
one-third of all crowdfunding offerings coming from issuers based 
in that state.368 New York, Texas, and Florida all have significant 
numbers of crowdfunding offerings, but they each account for only 
about one-fifth the number of issuers as California.369 This comes 
as no surprise, as those four boast the largest populations of all the 
states.370 When it comes to successful fundraising totals, California 
also leads the pack, with more than triple its closest competitor, 
Texas, and more than five times the state in third place, 
Massachusetts.371 
At first blush, crowdfunding appears to have replicated the 
existing geographic centers of venture finance in Silicon Valley, 
Austin and Boston. Furthermore, at least fourteen states have not 
had a single local company even attempt to raise money in this 
way.372 And this group of states—Iowa, the Dakotas, West Virginia 
                                                                                                     
rather than move to California, the siren song of wealthy and 
experienced angel investors is near impossible to resist. You can’t keep 
the kid on the farm, as they say. 
 367. Id. at 292–93. 
 368. See IVANOV & KNYAZEVA, supra note 346, at 18 (noting that California 
also led in the target amount sought, the number of offerings reported complete, 
and the amount reported raised). 
 369. See id. at 18 (noting that New York had the second most offerings, with 
9% of the total). 
 370. See Idaho is Nation’s Fastest-Growing State, Census Bureau Reports, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2017/estimates-idaho.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) (finding that 
California is the largest state by population with an estimated 39,536,653 
residents, followed by Texas (28,304,596), Florida (20,984,400), and New York 
(19,849,399)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 371. See CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, supra note 256 (focusing on 
Chart 9). 
 372. See id. (focusing on Chart 8, which shows zero offerings from 
Washington, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, 
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and others—is closely correlated with the rural areas who were 
supposed to benefit from crowdfunding’s ability to overcome 
geography.373 
On the other hand, a solid majority of the states have seen 
their companies launch crowdfunding campaigns, and this 
includes many states that are largely off the radar of traditional 
VCs and angel investors, such as Idaho, New Mexico and South 
Carolina.374 To cherry-pick one example, Alabama-based 
companies raised nearly as much as Colorado-based companies in 
the first year of crowdfunding.375 In the end, although it obviously 
has not transformed Bismarck into Boston, or Pine Bluff into Palo 
Alto, crowdfunding has in fact achieved some real amount of 
geographic inclusivity. 
Beyond geography, crowdfunding also shows modest success 
when it comes to demographic inclusivity. It has been well 
documented that women and minorities have very little success in 
attracting traditional methods of startup finance, namely venture 
capital and angel investment.376 To offer just one statistic, only 8% 
of companies that receive venture capital investment have female 
founders.377 Crowdfunding was supposed to help ameliorate this 
disparity by allowing all entrepreneurs, of every demographic 
stripe, to pitch their idea to the crowd for funding.378 
                                                                                                     
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Iowa, Arkansas, Wisconsin, Kentucky, West Virginia, and 
Virginia). 
 373. See Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, supra note 123, at 292–93 
(discussing the increased access to investors that securities crowdfunding has 
brought to rural entrepreneurs). 
 374. See CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, supra note 256 (focusing on 
Chart 8). 
 375. See id. (finding that Colorado-based companies raised $933,000 and 
Alabama-based companies raised $825,000). 
 376. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 622–23 (noting the 
“severe lack of access to startup financing” for women and racial minorities). 
 377. See Habib Jamal, Crowdfunding’s Potential for Minority and Women 
Owned Enterprises, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS (July 28, 2014), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/235308665/Crowdfunding-s-Potential-for-
Minority-and-Women-Owned-Enterprises (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that 
“41% of businesses are women owned, but only 8% of ventures that are backed by 
professional investors are founded by women”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 378. See Schwartz, Digital Shareholder, supra note 9, at 623 (“Crowdfunding 
offers a new and inclusive way to bring needed financing to startups all across 
America, from coast to coast, in rural areas and urban, to entrepreneurs rich and 
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To some extent, this has happened. Companies with at least 
one female founder represented about 20% of American 
crowdfunding campaigns, and nearly 90% of companies founded by 
women-only teams were successfully funded.379 Although the 
absolute numbers for this latter statistic were quite small (seven 
of eight), these statistics are encouraging.380 At the same time, 
further statistical analysis would be needed to fully answer 
whether crowdfunding is succeeding in its goal of providing a 
demographically inclusive form of entrepreneurial finance.381 For 
now, it appears that crowdfunding has been at least somewhat 
successful in giving entrepreneurs of every demographic group a 
fair chance to obtain financing.382 
Overall, American crowdfunding has achieved substantial 
success in creating an inclusive environment for entrepreneurs, 
especially as compared to New Zealand. Brand-new companies 
with nothing but an idea are given a chance to try to convince the 
crowd to fund their business, and the market is also fairly inclusive 
in terms of geography and demography. 
                                                                                                     
poor, young and old, men and women of every race, ethnicity, and religion.”); 
Jamal, supra note 377 (providing evidence on the reality of crowdfund investing 
for women and minorities). 
 379. See Women and Minorities in Regulation Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND 
CAP. ADVISORS (May 4, 2017), http://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/women-
minorities-regulation-crowdfunding/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that 
companies with only male founders had a 41% success rate) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 380. See id. (providing data showing that 68 out of 165 companies founded by 
white men were successful). 
 381. Cf. John R. Becker-Blease & Jeffrey E. Sohl, Do Women-Owned 
Businesses Have Equal Access to Angel Capital?, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 503, 504 
(2007) (reporting on survey finding that only 9% of proposals presented to angel 
investors came from women entrepreneurs). 
 382. One demographic group that should, in theory, benefit by an inclusive 
system of crowdfunding is youthful entrepreneurs. See Schwartz, Teenage 
Crowdfunding, supra note 125, at 516 (“Teenagers, being experts at Facebook, 
Snapchat, Twitter, Instagram and such, are very well positioned to take 
advantage of the online securities exemption that the [JOBS] Act 
creates. . . . [S]ecurities crowdfunding may well develop into an important 
funding source for financing teenage startup companies . . . .”). This aspect of 
demographic inclusivity is not addressed because the author is unaware of any 
statistics or data showing the extent to which young entrepreneurs have sought 
to finance their companies via crowdfunding. 
950 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885 (2018) 
V. Inclusive Crowdfunding is a Luxury 
The divergent laws, regulations, policy goals and practical 
results of crowdfunding in the United States and New Zealand 
teach that there is a trade-off between inclusivity and efficiency.383 
The American system is more inclusive, but less efficient; the New 
Zealand system is more efficient, but less inclusive. This is an 
important lesson, especially for the many countries around the 
world presently in the process of drafting and implementing their 
own crowdfunding laws, such as Australia, which enacted its law 
in March 2017, which is scheduled to go into effect in September 
2017.384 It is also highly relevant to those countries, including the 
United States, that are considering whether and how to reform the 
crowdfunding laws they currently have in place.385 
The evidence and analysis discussed in this Article indicate 
that the original concept for securities crowdfunding, where every 
entrepreneur would get the chance to pitch her idea to the crowd, 
is probably too inefficient to function.386 The gatekeeper model, 
which was adopted from the outset in New Zealand and belatedly 
in the United States, seems clearly to be more efficient for all 
participants in the market, both in theory and in practice.387 But it 
is also exclusive by its nature because it relies on intermediaries 
to curate their listings and exclude many companies who request 
access to the crowd. 
The upshot is that policymakers around the world need to 
think carefully about which policy goal they are trying to achieve—
inclusivity or efficiency—and design their crowdfunding market 
accordingly. It may be possible to achieve both goals, but the 
                                                                                                     
 383. See supra notes 337–364 and accompanying text (comparing New 
Zealand’s focus on efficiency with the United States’ concern for inclusivity in 
crowdfunding policies).  
 384. See, e.g., Corporations Amendment (Crowd-Sourced Funding) Act 2017 
(Cth) (Austl.) (codifying Australian crowdfunding law, enacted on March 28, 
2017). 
 385. See, e.g., Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. §§ 476–479 
(2017) (proposing legislation altering current crowdfunding laws). 
 386. See Ibrahim, supra note 130, at 1506 (“True crowd-based investing was 
always a fantasy.”). 
 387. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the steps New Zealand has taken to 
ensure efficiency in their crowdfunding market); see also Ibrahim, supra note 130, 
at 1499 (calling for even “more curation” in crowdfunding (emphasis in original)). 
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experience in the United States is not encouraging on that front.388 
In going for both at the same time, the American system ended up 
being only weakly inclusive, and not very efficient.389 It is possible 
that a different set of laws could have worked better to promote 
both inclusivity and efficiency at the same time, but the most 
immediate lesson seems to be that a crowdfunding market will 
work best if a clear choice between one and the other is made. 
So which to choose? It seems that the most important 
consideration for policymakers deciding whether to enact an 
efficient crowdfunding regime, or an inclusive one, is whether their 
jurisdiction already has an effective source of early stage venture 
capital.390 If a country has a deep and well-functioning set of VC 
funds and angel investors that are available to finance promising 
startup companies, then it can afford to design a relatively 
inefficient crowdfunding market as an inclusive complement to 
that source of capital. On the other hand, if a country lacks VC 
funds and angel investors, and therefore needs a new and 
significant source of early stage capital, it should try to create an 
efficient system for crowdfunding; inclusivity is a luxury it cannot 
afford. 
This suggested decision-making process is consistent with 
what we have seen happening over the past few years around the 
world. Countries with shallow pools of VC and angel investment 
have tried to enact efficient crowdfunding regimes that would 
serve as a substitute source of capital for its startup companies. 
And countries with deep pools of VC and angel investment have 
adopted inclusive and inefficient crowdfunding laws—or have not 
even adopted a crowdfunding law at all.391 
                                                                                                     
 388. See supra notes 349–352 and accompanying text (discussing the 
crowdfunding considerations that allow for an inclusive market). 
 389. See supra Part II.D (reviewing the regulatory history of crowdfunding in 
the United States and the tension between efficiency and inclusivity). 
 390. See supra notes 225–234 and accompanying text (noting the difference 
in the levels of pre-existing early stage venture capital between the United States 
and New Zealand). 
 391. See generally AYAL SHENHAV & GAL HOFFMAN, EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING 
NETWORK, REVIEW OF CROWDFUNDING REGULATION: INTERPRETATIONS OF EXISTING 
REGULATION CONCERNING CROWDFUNDING IN EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND ISRAEL 
(2014), http://eurocrowd.winball2.de/wp-content/blogs.dir/sites/85/2014/12/ECN-
Review-of-Crowdfunding-Regulation-2014.pdf (providing an overview of the 
crowdfunding market and regulations in twenty-nine countries across Europe 
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Two countries stand out as having far and away the deepest 
pools of entrepreneurial capital (measured by percentage of 
venture capital as a percentage of GDP): Israel and the United 
States.392 These countries do not ‘need’ crowdfunding to fund their 
promising startup companies.393 They can afford to enact a 
crowdfunding law that is designed to be inclusive, even at the 
expense of efficiency, or even decline to pass a crowdfunding law 
in the first place. Thus the United States, as discussed above, 
adopted an inclusive crowdfunding regime that suffers from 
inefficiency, and Israel has yet to enact any sort of crowdfunding 
law at all.394 Going forward, the United States should consider 
amending the JOBS Act to achieve greater inclusivity among 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs, even at the cost of efficiency. We can 
afford it. 
Other countries have few VCs and angels and thus really need 
some new and efficient means of channeling capital to promising 
early stage startup companies. Examples of these sorts of countries 
are Italy and New Zealand. Scaled for the size of its economy, 
Italy’s venture capital activity amounts to less than 1% of the 
United States, the lowest in Western Europe; the relevant 
percentage for New Zealand is 8%.395 It should come as no surprise 
that these countries would be quick to enact securities 
crowdfunding laws. The New Zealand experience was discussed in 
                                                                                                     
and North America, as well as Israel). 
 392. See Entrepenuership at a Glance 2016: Venture Capital Investments as a 
Percentage of GDP: Percentage, 2015, or Latest Available Year, OECDILIBRARY 
(2016), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/entrepreneurship-at-
a-glance-2016/venture-capital-investments-as-a-percentage-of-
gdp_entrepreneur_aag-2016-graph119-en (last updated Sept. 28, 2016) (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Venture Capital] (providing data on venture 
capital investments as a percentage of gross domestic product for thirty-two 
countries) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 393. See id. (noting the significant drop off in late stage venture funding 
between the United States and Israel and the rest of the surveyed countries).  
 394. See SHENHAV & HOFFMAN, supra note 391, at 130 (discussing proposed 
crowdfunding legislation in Israel). Reports indicate that the Israeli government 
is in the process of enacting regulations to cover equity crowdfunding. See Is 
Equity Crowdfunding right for you, VCFORU, https://www.vcforu.com/equity-
crowdfunding (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that on “March 20, 2017 the 
Israeli Government passed a new regulation on equity crowdfunding”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 395. Venture Capital, supra note 392.  
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detail above, and a similar story unfolded in Italy.396 
Italy was the first in the world to enact a securities 
crowdfunding law, outpacing even New Zealand.397 Italy’s 
legislation was passed in 2012 and went into effect in 2013, and it 
had several features consistent with a policy goal of creating an 
efficient source of entrepreneurial capital, including a legal 
requirement that issuers be “innovative start-up” companies, and 
that every issuance be led by a professional cornerstone investor.398 
Furthermore, when Italy’s crowdfunding law did not lead to as 
much investment as the government had hoped, it went back to 
the drawing board and issued a revised law in 2016.399 Italy is 
understandably trying to make its crowdfunding system more 
efficient, because the country desperately needs it to fill in for the 
absence of VC and angel investors. 
In sum, the key question for policymakers around the world 
deciding on a new or revised crowdfunding law is whether their 
country needs equity crowdfunding as a substitute for VC and 
angel investment, or if it can afford to have crowdfunding serve as 
a complement to existing VC and angel financing. Countries that 
already possess sufficient pools of entrepreneurial capital can 
afford to undermine the efficiency of their crowdfunding regime by 
trying to make it inclusive. But countries that lack satisfactory 
levels of startup finance cannot afford that luxury; they need to 
follow New Zealand’s lead and focus exclusively on efficiency, at 
the cost of inclusivity. 
                                                                                                     
 396. See supra Part III.B (discussing New Zealand’s reaction to the United 
States JOBS Act through crowdfunding regulations).  
 397. See Blair Bowman, A Comparative Analysis of Crowdfunding Regulation 
in the United States and Italy, 33 WIS. INT’L L. J. 318, 332 (2015) (reporting that 
Italy enacted the “world’s first equity crowdfunding law, the Decreto Crescita 
Bis,” in 2012). 
 398. See id. at 339–41 (discussing the bars to participation in equity 
crowdfunding in Italy). 
 399. See Italy Opens Up Equity Crowdfunding to All Kinds of SMEs, 
EUROPEAN CROWDFUNDING NETWORK (Dec. 13, 2016), 
http://eurocrowd.org/2016/12/13/italy-opens-equity-crowdfunding-kind-smes/
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (noting that the new Italian law allows “any SME to 
raise funds via equity crowdfunding”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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VI. Conclusion 
This Article provided a theoretical and empirical study of 
securities crowdfunding in the United States and New Zealand. It 
analyzed the origins, the legislation, and the regulation of 
crowdfunding in the two jurisdictions,400 and provided data on the 
first year of practical experience in each country.401 To a significant 
degree, the policy goals in each country have been achieved.402 
The law in the United States was designed to create a market 
that is both inclusive and efficient, and in practice it has achieved 
a little of each.403 American crowdfunding welcomes all types of 
investors and has created a space for a broad swath of 
entrepreneurs to pitch their ideas to the crowd.404 At the same 
time, the market has not been a huge financial impact, having 
raised just $35 million across all companies in its first year.405 
The law in New Zealand was designed for efficiency only and 
it has achieved its goal in practice.406 Crowdfunding companies in 
New Zealand have conducted thirteen times as many campaigns 
and raised thirty times as much capital than their counterparts in 
the United States, with a much higher success rate.407 Unlike in 
the United States, the New Zealand market is not particularly 
                                                                                                     
 400. See supra Part II.A–B (describing the foundations and regulations of 
crowdfunding regulation in the United States); supra Part III.A–B (describing 
New Zealand’s crowdfunding regulations and comparing them to those in the 
United States). 
 401. See supra Part IV (comparing the results of the first year of crowdfunding 
regulations in the United States and New Zealand). 
 402. See supra Part II.C (discussing the United States’ policy goals in 
crowdfunding regulation); supra Part III.C (describing New Zealand’s policy goals 
and the results of crowdfunding regulation). 
 403. See supra Part II.C (describing the steps taken by the United States to 
ensure a crowdfunding market that is both efficient and inclusive). 
 404. See supra notes 376–382 (discussing the impact of equity crowdfunding 
regulations on female and minority entrepreneurs). 
 405. See The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/stats (last visited Jan. 25, 2018) (noting that as of January 
25, 2018 investors had funded $56,106,031) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 406. See supra Part III.C (discussing New Zealand’s policy goals of efficiency 
in crowdfunding regulations). 
 407. See supra notes 246–259 (comparing the first-year success rates of 
crowdfunding in New Zealand and the United States). 
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inclusive, especially of entrepreneurs, but then it was never 
designed to be.408  
The broader lesson for countries around the world in the 
process of designing or reforming their own crowdfunding laws is 
that they should decide whether they are trying to create an 
inclusive system, an efficient system, or if they are trying to 
balance the two. Once they settle upon their policy goals, they can 
craft their laws accordingly, using New Zealand or the United 
States as a model. Countries that lack a deep pool of 
entrepreneurial finance (like New Zealand) should probably focus 
on efficiency, while countries that already have a mature market 
for VC and angel investment (like the United States) can afford to 
try for both goals at once. 
                                                                                                     
408. See generally Schwartz, Crowdfunding Social Enterprise, supra note  59 
(reporting that approximately one-third of the companies that attempt to (and 
succeed in) raise money via equity crowdfunding in New Zealand can be classified 
as “social enterprises”). 
